Essays on the Effects of Trade Liberalization. by D'Costa, Sabine
Essays on the effects of trade liberalization
by
Sabine D’Costa
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Economics)
in The University of Michigan
2010
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Katherine Terrell (Deceased), Chair
Professor Alan V. Deardorff
Professor John E. DiNardo
Assistant Professor Andrei A. Levchenko





I thank my parents for giving me the best education possible, and for their unwavering support,
love, and encouragement throughout my studies. I also owe this achievement to the support and
encouragement I have received from family, friends of many years, as well as colleagues at the
University of Michigan and the London School of Economics.
I am very grateful to my committee for their precious help in the completion of this dissertation,
and particularly to my chair the late Professor Terrell for her enthusiasm and constant encourage-
ment. She will remain in my memory as an exceptionally caring and dedicated advisor, and I hope
to continue to be inspired by her in my future career and in particular in my relationship with my
students. I am also indebted to faculty at the LSE for their help and suggestions on my work, and
I thank the Centre for Economic Performance at the LSE for its hospitality during the latter years
of my doctoral studies.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
CHAPTER
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Input linkages, productivity and trade liberalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Theoretical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Empirical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.2 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.3 Econometric difficulties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.1 Basic specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.2 Corrections for endogeneity and serially correlated standard errors 19
2.4.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.4 Levinsohn-Petrin productivity estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
III. Trade liberalization and the geographical concentration of industries . . . 33
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Trade patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Industry concentration patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3.1 Measuring geographical concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3.2 The patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Testing for the relationship between trade and geographical concentration . . 42
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
IV. Trade liberalization and the size distribution of plants in Colombia . . . . 56
iv
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 Theoretical predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3 Data description and the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.4 The distribution of plant size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4.1 The impact of trade liberalization on plant dynamics . . . . . . . . 64
4.4.2 The impact of trade liberalization on the size distributions . . . . . 64
4.4.3 The role of incumbents vs. that of net entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.5 Industry variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5.1 Variation according to export extensiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5.2 Variation according to the degree of tariff changes . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84




2.1 Imports by industry, constant HUF, 1992-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Annual growth in imports, 1992-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 First derivative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Second derivative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1 Total trade flows with the EU-15 in million HUF (base 1992), 1992-2002 . . . . . . 51
3.2 Exports by industry deflated by value added, 1992-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Imports by industry deflated by value added, 1992-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 Share of each region in total manufacturing, 2002 v. 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Krugman concentration index, 2002 vs. 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 Share of Budapest county in each industry, 2002 vs. 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 Distributions of plant employment by exporter status in 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2 The distribution of ln employment vs.the normal distribution: exporters . . . . . . 78
4.3 The distribution of ln employment vs.the normal distribution: non-exporters . . . 79
4.4 Distributions of plant employment over time, by exporter status . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5 Stayers: plants exporting in 1981 and 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6 Stoppers: plants exporting in 1981 but not in 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.7 Starters: plants operating and not exporting in 1981, but exporting in 1986 . . . . 81
4.8 Starters: plants not operating in 1981, but exporting in 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.9 Exporters in export extensive vs. non extensive industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.10 High vs. low tariff cut industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
B.1 GDP growth in Hungary, 1986-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
C.1 Political map of Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
D.1 Distributions of plant size scaled by plant age, by exporter status (1981) . . . . . . 88
D.2 Distributions of plant size scaled by age: exporters (1981, 1986 and 1990) . . . . . 89
D.3 Distributions of plant size scaled by age: non-exporters (1981, 1986 and 1990) . . . 89
E.1 Ln plant employment scaled by mean industry employment - exporters . . . . . . . 90




2.1 Summary statistics by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Summary statistics by industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Manufacturing industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Mean potential input linkages and imports by firm size category . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Production function OLS regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.7 Production functions by industry (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.8 Production functions with interaction, by industry (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.9 Comparison of small and large firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.10 Regional comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.11 Potential input linkages and imports in Budapest and Pest vs. all other regions . . 26
2.12 Potential input linkages and imports after exclusion of outliers . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.13 Exclusion of outliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.14 Value-added production functions by industry (Levinsohn-Petrin) . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.15 Value added production functions by industry (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.16 OLS regression of LP productivity estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Predictions on the effect of an increase in international trade . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Manufacturing industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Summary statistics of the variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 Trade flows and geographical concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Lagged trade flows and geographical concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.6 High vs. low concentration industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.7 Trade flows and the employment share of Budapest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.8 Lagged trade flows and the employment share of Budapest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.9 High vs. low Budapest share industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.1 Summary of predictions on firm dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 Summary of predictions on the size distribution of exporters and non-exporters . . 73
4.3 Summary statistics by industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Summary statistics for exporters by industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.5 Skewness-kurtosis tests of normality on ln plant employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.6 Summary of predictions, by period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.7 Distribution of plant employment - exporters vs. non-exporters . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.8 Predictions vs. outcomes, by period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77




A. Data used in chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
B. World Bank estimates of GDP growth rates for the period 1986-2002 . . . . . . . . . 86
C. Political map of Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
D. Distribution of employment scaled by plant age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
E. Check for a composition effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90




Most of the early literature on the impact of trade liberalization has been concerned with the
impact on aggregate welfare indicators. More recently the literature has focused on the impact on
the productivity of export oriented firms or import competing firms. In this dissertation I analyze
three additional ways in which trade liberalization can affect the economy of the liberalizing country.
Chapter 1 explores the impact on input linkages at the firm level, using firm-level data. Chapter
2 considers the effects on the geographical concentration of industries using regional industry-level
data. Finally chapter 3 looks at the impact on the size distribution of plants, by exporter status,
using plant level data.
In chapter 1, I investigate how the availability of imported intermediates affects firm productivity
through the channel of input linkages. Input linkages imply that firms are more productive if the
region where they are located offers them proximity to input suppliers.
I first set up a simple model of international trade inspired by Krugman (1980) to show that
as trade costs go down, productivity of the domestic composite good increases less in the number
of domestic varieties. To my knowledge, the notion that input linkages are weakened as trade is
liberalized has only been supported by simulation results in theoretical models of new economic
geography trying to assess the impact of trade on regional concentration (Krugman and Elizondo
(1996), Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), chapter 18 and Crozet and Koenig (2004)).
I then provide empirical evidence combining firm-level data with trade data and measures of input
linkages. I show that the positive impact of input linkages with local suppliers on firm productivity is
reduced as the imports of similar inputs increase. This paper is related to Amiti and Konings (2007),
who focus on the impact of the liberalization of trade in intermediates on firm-level productivity
during Indonesia’s trade liberalization. Their dataset allows them to identify the effect of trade
liberalization on firms that import their inputs compared to other firms in the same sector. In
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contrast, my paper focuses on local input linkages and their interaction with the liberalization of
trade in intermediates, and it also offers a theoretical model that motivates the empirical work.
The main contribution of this paper is that it combines trade liberalization with the notion of
input linkages and is able to identify their combined effect on firm-level productivity. It investigates
a new channel through which trade liberalization can affect firm productivity. The results may also
lend empirical support to those economic geography models that rely on the weakening of input (and
output) linkages by trade. Moreover, the empirical implementation avoids the endogeneity issues
related to the cumulative causation process linking firm productivity and firm location. Finally, this
paper proposes a theoretical foundation for such empirical investigations.
In chapter 2, I consider the fact that industries may geographically concentrate or spread. This
is because trade re-orientation or liberalization impacts the sub-national location of industries by
altering the balance of dispersion and concentration forces and by modifying the patterns of market
and supplier access. This paper aims to answer the question empirically given that the results of
the relevant theoretical models hinge on a set of initial conditions. I estimate the relation between
trade and the spatial concentration of industries and the relation between trade and the share
of the economic center (Budapest) in an industry. Regressions of the Krugman index of industrial
concentration on industry exports and imports of inputs reveal that exports increase the geographical
concentration of industries, and more so for industries that were initially dispersed. Furthermore,
higher exports reduce the share of the capital Budapest in an industry, and more so for industries
that initially had a low share of Budapest. Combining these results reveals that increased exports
in an industry have brought about higher geographical concentration away from the capital region.
This means that trade has increased the geographical concentration of industries without necessarily
reinforcing existing industrial networks.
Most of the literature on industry localization (also called geographical concentration of indus-
tries) has either described the evolution of industry concentration over time, or estimated the deter-
minants of industry concentration. The literature investigating the determinants of the geographical
concentration of industries began with Kim (1995). The findings from this literature are that there
is little evidence that labor, capital or resource intensity increases the geographical concentration of
industries, and mixed evidence on the effect of demand and cost linkages as well as trade liberaliza-
tion. There is positive evidence that technology intensive and high returns to scale industries are
more concentrated. In this chapter I take into account the results of the literature by accounting for
the characteristics of industries that have been proved to explain industry localization.
In contrast there are very few empirical papers estimating the sub-national effects of trade lib-
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eralization on the location of industries. Overman and Winters (2003) analyze the impact of the
accession of the United Kingdom into the EU on the location of industries in the United Kingdom.
They find evidence of relocation towards the South East, caused by market access to mainland Eu-
rope. My results shed light on the impact of liberalization on the geographical concentration levels
of industries as well as on relocation away from the capital region.
In chapter 3, I investigate how trade liberalization affects the size distributions of exporters and
non exporters. I rely on predictions that can be extracted from heterogeneous-firms trade models
and confront them with actual distributions derived from Colombian data before and after policy
changes. This is interesting from a policy perspective because it can explain whether a policy that
favors exporters has generated an export boom where the largest and most productive incumbent
exporters grow, or one where the bulk of the increase in exports comes from massive entry of smaller
plants into the export market.
Overall most of the results in this chapter support the predictions from Melitz (2003) as well as
the long-run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). I identify a distinct leftward shift in the
size distribution of exporters during a period of currency depreciation and unilateral tariff increases,
which remains later while the currency is stable and tariffs are cut drastically. In contrast, the size
distribution of non exporters does not shift but becomes more peaked with shorter tails in the first
period, then becomes less peaked again during the second period. I then show that the bulk of
the leftward shift in the size distribution of exporters is due to massive entry of smaller plants into
exporting, which is consistent with both models.
So far the literature on the distribution of firm size has focused on establishing stylized facts
about the size distribution of firms, irrespective of their exporter status. And the existing empirical
literature examining the impact of international trade liberalization on firm size has used mostly
parametric estimation methods, and focused on average effects or on effects on specific quantiles
of the distribution, without comparing the impact on exporting vs. that on non-exporting firms
or plants. To summarize the empirical evidence, there is ample evidence that trade liberalization
increases exit, however there is mixed evidence regarding the impact on plant size. Most of the
evidence shows that greater import competition reduces average plant size, while greater export
possibilities tend to increase average plant size. Finally, Nocke and Yeaple (2006) focus directly on
the impact of trade on the overall distribution of firm size, however they summarize the distribution
of firm size using a measure of its dispersion. This does not explain leftward or rightward shifts in
the distribution. Moreover their framework does not allow them to distinguish between the impact
on exporters and non-exporters. On the other hand, this chapter, by using the Melitz (2003) and the
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Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) models, is able to derive theoretical predictions on how the distribution
of firm size would be affected by trade policy changes, for the sample of exporters and non-exporters.
This chapter therefore contributes to the literature on the distribution of plant size by establishing
that the size distribution of exporters is lognormal whereas that of non exporters is more right skewed.
It also contributes to the trade literature that estimates the effects of trade liberalization, by testing
predictions derived from two heterogeneous-firms models regarding effects on the size distribution
of plants by exporter status. The results also add to the wide literature on how exporting plants
differ from non exporters.
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CHAPTER II
Input linkages, productivity and trade liberalization
2.1 Introduction
Many researchers and policy makers are concerned with the impact of trade liberalization on
the productivity of export oriented firms, or of import competing firms. Empirical studies of trade
liberalization focus on relationships between trade policy in certain sectors and the performance of
domestic firms in those same sectors.1 However, much has still to be said on how domestic firm
performance can also be affected by the availability of imported intermediates. Indeed, imported
intermediates can come to replace locally produced ones, as input linkages such as those that prevail
in regional industrial clusters are weakened. Consequences of this would include the decline of
regional industrial clusters (also called local industrial networks) and the relocation of industries.
In this paper, I investigate how the availability of imported intermediates affects firm productivity
through the channel of input linkages. Input linkages imply that firms are more productive if the
region where they are located offers them proximity to input suppliers. The relevance of input
linkages to firm productivity is straightforward in a closed economy, but it may weaken when foreign
intermediates become available. This paper therefore tries to answer the following question: Does
the availability of inputs in a firm’s region have a sustained positive impact on firm productivity as
imports are liberalized?
On the theoretical side, Ethier (1982) pointed out that when trade liberalization increases the
number of varieties of intermediates available, firm productivity may increase. Furthermore, a main
feature of the Dixit-Stiglitz model is the love for variety effect. Ciccone and Hall (1996) use this
notion in an empirical investigation of the role of economic density on regional productivity in the
absence of trade. They use a simple closed economy model of monopolistic competition with a two-
1See Tybout (2003) for a survey on plant-level evidence.
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tier production function to show that increasing the number of intermediate varieties available in a
location increases the productivity in the production of the local composite good. To my knowledge,
the notion that input linkages are weakened as trade is liberalized has only been supported by
simulation results in theoretical models of new economic geography trying to assess the impact of
trade on regional concentration (Krugman and Elizondo (1996), Fujita, Krugman, and Venables
(1999), chapter 18 and Crozet and Koenig (2004)).
On the empirical side, the economic geography literature has linked agglomeration economies
and productivity. However these papers do not analyze input linkages as sources of agglomeration
economies, and they abstract from international trade. They focus on establishing the role of market
access, knowledge spillovers, and labor pooling in productivity (Lall, Salizi, and Deichmann (2004)),
or try to discriminate between the contributions of specialization versus diversification of a region in
its productivity (Henderson, Lee, and Lee (2001)). Amiti and Cameron (2007) have demonstrated
the role of supplier access on firm wages in Indonesia, while Javorcik (2004) has identified positive
FDI spillovers going from foreign owned clients towards domestic suppliers. Encouraging evidence
of the positive contribution of a wider set of inputs to productivity is found in Feenstra, Markusen,
and Zeile (1992). Using the case of the vertically integrated Korean chaebols, they show that TFP
growth of final goods producers within the chaebols increases in the availability of new inputs coming
from within-chaebol firms.
This paper is related to Amiti and Konings (2007), who focus on the impact of the liberalization
of trade in intermediates on firm-level productivity during Indonesia’s trade liberalization. They
find that a 10% fall in input tariffs has a higher impact on productivity than a 10% fall in output
tariffs. Their dataset allows them to identify the effect of trade liberalization on firms that import
their inputs compared to other firms in the same sector. In contrast, my paper focuses on local input
linkages and their interaction with the liberalization of trade in intermediates, and it also offers a
theoretical model that motivates the empirical work.
I offer empirical evidence combining firm-level data with trade data and input linkages data. I
use a panel of Hungarian manufacturing firms extracted from the Amadeus database. The data span
eight years (1995-2002) during which Hungary liberalized its trade with the European Union. The
Europe Agreement with Hungary was signed in December 1991, and the bulk of the liberalization
of manufacturing imports from the EU into Hungary occurred between 1997 and 2000. There was
considerable variation in the import flows during the period of this study. I show that the positive
impact of input linkages with local suppliers on firm productivity is reduced as the imports of similar
inputs increase.
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The main innovation of this paper is that it combines trade liberalization with the notion of local
input linkages and is able to identify their combined effect on firm-level productivity. It investigates
a new channel through which trade liberalization can affect firm productivity. The results may also
lend empirical support to those economic geography models that rely on the weakening of input (and
output) linkages by trade. Moreover, the empirical implementation avoids the endogeneity issues
related to the cumulative causation process linking firm productivity and firm location. Finally, this
paper proposes a theoretical foundation for such empirical investigations.
In the next section I lay out a simple model of international trade inspired by Krugman (1980) to
show that as trade costs go down, productivity of the domestic composite good increases less in the
number of domestic varieties. Section 3 then briefly describes the data and develops the empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents the results.
2.2 Theoretical background
I begin by using a model inspired by Krugman (1980)’s open economy model of monopolistic
competition. There is a final good and an intermediate composite good sector. The composite good
is made of intermediate varieties which are tradable. We focus on derivations concerning the home
country H. Variables denoting the foreign country are identified by an asterisk and derivations are
analogous to those for the home country.
Final good
The final good is produced according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
(2.1) G = lλyγ
where λ, γ < 1, l is labor and y is the composite good.
Let L denote the total amount of labor in H, and w the domestic wage. The price of the final good
is normalized to 1. Since the share of the final good paid to labor is λ,
wl = λG.
Also, since all final output is paid to labor working in the final and intermediate sectors,
wL = G.
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Therefore l = λL, λ is the fraction of L working in the final good sector, and 1 − λ is the fraction
working in the composite good sector.
Composite good
Good y is produced following a CES production function:







where c is the absorption of each domestic variety in H, cF the absorption of each foreign variety
in H, n and n? are the number of intermediate varieties at home and in the foreign country, µ > 1
and σ = 1
1− 1µ
is the elasticity of substitution.
Production decision of each variety
All intermediates are produced with the same technology at home and abroad. Let x and x? be
the amount of each domestic and foreign variety produced. The cost function for domestic varieties
is:
(2.3) C(w, x) = αw + βwx,
and that for varieties produced abroad is:
C(w?, x) = αw? + βw?x,
with α, β > 0.
So the price of each domestic variety is:
(2.4) p = wβµ,
and that of each foreign variety is p? = w?βµ.
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The zero-profit condition in the production of each variety yields:
(2.5) x = x? =
α
β(µ− 1) .
Full employment of labor
The number of units of labor required to produce x is
α + βx = α
µ
µ− 1 ,







Similarly, n? = µ−1µ
(1−λ)L?








Let the two countries engage in trade, with iceberg trade cost g being the fraction of the goods
that reaches. In the home country, p̂? = p?/g is the price of imported intermediates. In the foreign
country the price of imported intermediates is p̂ = p/g.
















where ω is the relative wage p/p?.
Let d and dF be the domestic demand for domestic varieties and for foreign varieties, respectively.
9
















First I determine the impact of a greater number of varieties on productivity in the closed economy.





By substituting equation (2.5) into this function, the output of y becomes
(2.9) y = xnµ
and the productivity of the production process of good y in autarky is output divided by input:
xnµ
nx , that is:
(2.10) proda = nµ−1.
This is the closed economy result highlighted in Ciccone and Hall (1996), that productivity is in-
creasing in the number of varieties available.
Productivity in the open economy
In the open economy, in order to determine the amount of output produced, I substitute for cF
in the production function for y.





(2.11) y = c[n + n?(gω)
1
µ−1 ]µ.







which is analogous to the expression found in the closed economy case.





















J is the second order effect: J = ∂ω∂n .
Intuitively we expect the sign of this derivative to be positive: Productivity of the composite
good increases in the number of varieties available locally. I evaluate the sign of expression (2.13)
graphically, as a function of ω and µ. Since the first term on the right hand side is positive, I plot
Z1, in order to evaluate its sign.
I choose reasonable parameter values by which to plot Z1:
• I choose n < n?, since we are in a context of trade liberalization where a small country opens
up to trade with a larger group of countries. For the graph I choose n = 100 and n? = 1000.
• Since a standard result of Krugman (1980) is that ‘the larger country, other things equal, will
have the higher wage’, we know that J = ∂ω∂n > 0.
• From the same result, if L < L? then ω < 1. Therefore I plot Z1 for ω ranging from 0 to 1.
• The ‘markup’ µ is chosen to range from 1 to 2.
• I choose any g in (0,1). Let g=0.7.
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We see on Figure 2.3 that this expression is positive, for most of the reasonable parameter
values. The restriction for this to hold is that J = ∂ω∂n is not too small (say J > 0.005). There are
no restrictions on g or µ.
This paper aims at identifying whether this positive impact of the number of local varieties on
firm productivity is maintained as trade is liberalized. In order to evaluate this, I look at the sign
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and K = ∂ω∂g .
Since we are looking at the productivity of domestic inputs, we intuitively expect this expression
to have a negative sign: as trade is liberalized (g increases) we expect the contribution of the number
of domestic varieties to the productivity of domestic inputs to decrease. Again, I identify the sign
of this partial effect by graphical simulation. Since δ µLA
µ−1 > 0, I plot Z2 as a function of ω and µ.
I keep the values of the parameters common to the previous simulation unchanged. Following the
same reasoning employed for J , we know that K = ∂ω∂g < 0.
The second derivative is thus negative, as appears in Figure 2.4. However this expression is
highly nonlinear and the sign is very sensitive to parameter values: Z2 ceases being negative for all
0 < ω < 1 and 1 < µ < 2 for lower values of g or higher (less negative) values of K.
To sum up, we can draw from this stylized model that, under certain reasonable parameter
restrictions, productivity of the composite good is increasing in the number of local varieties available,
but less so as trade is liberalized.
2.3 Empirical analysis
2.3.1 Empirical model
The stylized model yields non-linear results, yet if we restrict parameters to reasonable values
we can draw clear predictions. I therefore take a reduced-form approach and test empirically how
12
trade liberalization affects the relationship between input linkages and productivity.
I estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function, where firm output is a function of inputs (capital
K, labor L, and materials M) and external factors that influence productivity (the presence of input
firms and the level of imports of input industries):
(2.16) yijrt = A.f(K, L, M),
(2.17) A = g(PILjrt, IIjt)
where yijrt is output of firm i in industry j, region r and year t, PILjrt is a measure of potential
input linkages2 at the industry-region-year level, and IIjt is a measure of the time t volume of the
imports from the EU3 which are relevant to industry j.
The estimable equation is:
ln yijrt = α0 + α1 ln Kijrt + α2 ln Lijrt + α3 ln Mijrt + β ln PILjrt(2.18)
+γ ln IIjt + δ ln PILjrt × ln IIjt + ηi + εijrt.
What I call input linkages is the presence in a firm’s region of firms that provide its inputs. So
a firm in industry j benefits from high input linkages if it is located in a region that has relatively
many firms that provide inputs for industry j. The variable tracking trade liberalization is the
volume of imports of those industries providing inputs to industry j, and is therefore industry and
year specific. According to the stylized model, the higher the volume of imports of input industries,
the lower the contribution of input linkages (the number of varieties in our stylized model) to firm
productivity.
I construct a measure of input linkages based on standard practise in the literature,4 and weight









2As will become clearer later, I speak of potential input linkages because I take into account the input linkages in
neighboring regions.
3Imports from the EU are used as a measure of trade liberalization, because these account for the bulk of the
variation in import flows.
4See Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser (1997) for the input linkages measure.
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Ikj is industry j’s share of inputs coming from industry k (k 6= j),5 and lkr′tlkt is the share of
region r′ in industry k employment in year t,
drr′ is the road distance in kilometers between the main city in region r and that in region r′,
with drr = 1.
We see that a firm’s level of input linkages, ILjrt, depends on the relative abundance in region
r (compared to the rest of the country) of those industries that represent a high share of industry
j’s inputs.6 IIjt = Σk 6=j ImportsktGDPkt × Ikj , so this measure is a weighted average of imports of other
industries (normalized by industry size) weighted by their share in j’s total inputs.
Finally, ηi is a firm level fixed effect (which includes the part of firm-level productivity which is
time invariant), and εijrt is the idiosyncratic error term.
According to the predictions of the stylized model, we expect to find the coefficient on the
interaction term, δ, negative and significant. I estimate equation (2.18) in two different ways, first
by OLS regression, then using the Levinsohn-Petrin productivity estimation method in order to
address the problems caused by the endogeneity of firms’ input choices.
2.3.2 Data description
The unbalanced firm-level panel dataset for 1995-2002 was constructed using the Amadeus
database (Top 1.5 million). The firms included in the database fulfill at least one of the follow-
ing three criteria: operating revenue of at least 1 million euros, total assets of at least 2 million
euros, and at least 15 employees.7 These data are extracted from financial statements and cover
17,600 firms. This represents about 9% of Hungarian firms (only 40% of Hungarian firms are required
to file accounts). After removing non-manufacturing firms, and firms with missing observations, the
final dataset contains 6,500 observations covering 1,300 firms.
The information available includes operating revenue, assets, cost of employees and of materials,
the industrial classification (according to the NACE classification, at the two-digit level) and the
location of the firms within the twenty administrative counties in Hungary, which we call regions in
this paper. I was therefore able to merge this firm-level dataset with regional characteristics and
with trade flow data. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give the geographic and industrial breakdown of the dataset.
5Intermediate inputs coming from the same industry are excluded from the measure for input linkages, because I
wish to focus on externalities from the agglomeration of diverse industries (Jacobs externalities) rather than from the
geographical concentration of a single industry (MAR externalities).
6Unlike in Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser (1997), this measure of input linkages does not take values between 0 and
1. This is because the Ikj do not sum to 1: They are the share of industry k in industry j’s total inputs, including
other non-manufacturing industries.
7So there are firms with very few employees as long as they have large turnover or assets.
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There is considerable variation in output across regions and across industries. I further aggregate
industries into eight major categories (see table 2.3), to match the classification of the data coming
from the Hungarian statistical institute (see Appendix 1 for a description of the data).
The fact that the time series begins in 1995 whereas trade liberalization began in 1992 should in
principle be a problem. However, as shown in figures 2.1 and 2.2, most of the growth in manufacturing
imports occurred after 1997 (although there was a first smaller increase in 1994), and import flows
by industry vary considerably during our time period.
Table 2.4 presents summary statistics for potential input linkages and import of inputs. There
is considerable variation in these measures, at least across groups.
2.3.3 Econometric difficulties
The most fundamental issue is that the potential input linkages are endogenous. They are
part of a cumulative causation process in which industry concentration and regional agglomeration
influence firm profits, which in turn influence firm location as well as survival in a region. This
selection bias issue is very common in economic geography models, in which the locations of demand
and production are determined jointly, and it makes these models difficult to test empirically.8 We
discuss below the various ways in which endogeneity issues may hamper our estimations, and offer
some solutions.
Reverse-causation from TFP to input linkages
The location of a firm i in a particular region does not directly increase this firm’s measure of PIL,
because PIL is a function of the presence of input firms in other industries than the one to which
i belongs. However, i’s location decision can affect its measure of PIL indirectly. For instance, if i
is a large, productive firm, (such as IBM or a car manufacturer) its location in r may attract many
input firms, making PILjrt increase in time. There would therefore be some positive correlation
between size (or productivity) and PIL and some causation from TFP to PIL. I first investigate
this possible issue by checking if larger firms have higher input linkages.
Table 2.5 shows that, far from having higher input linkages, larger firms, on average, have lower
input linkages. Still, in the next subsection, I run regressions separately for small and large firms as
a robustness check, and compare the results.
8This issue also arises in region-industry level regressions in Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser (1997), and in Ellison




Since firms choose where they initially locate, they can choose their initial level of potential input
linkages (PIL). We can therefore not assert that this initial level is assigned randomly. However,
because firms in our sample do not change their location throughout the period, all time invariant
regional (or industry-region) effects are captured in the firm fixed effect. What we exploit is therefore
the variation of PIL in time. Moreover, using Probit regressions of location in different regions on
PIL and other characteristics, we notice that PIL is a strong positive predictor of location in
Budapest and Pest (the capital and the region around the capital), and a strong negative predictor
of location in all the other regions. This indicates that firms do not always choose to locate in
regions where they will have high input linkages. In the next subsection, I run the model separately
for the subsample of firms outside Budapest and Pest.
Omitted variable bias
The regressions already control for omitted time-invariant regional characteristics through the
firm fixed effect. We may however suspect that there is an omitted variable that can be described
as the ‘attractiveness’ of region r in year t, which is difficult to measure and may be correlated with
potential input linkages. For example, improvement in a region’s infrastructure will not be captured
in our model. It would influence a firm’s output, and would definitely be correlated with changes in
the industrial composition of the region - and therefore with changes in PIL.
I do not offer an instrumental variable solution to this problem. The main reason is the lack of an
instrument for PIL that satisfies the exclusion restriction, i.e., that affects output only through its
impact on potential input linkages and not directly. For instance, a variable reporting improvements
in infrastructure would violate the exclusion restriction. Moreover, it will be difficult to find an
instrument that predicts potential input linkages well but is orthogonal to the attractiveness of the
region.
We can nevertheless try to sign the bias. Since the regional effect we have in mind is likely




Instead of an instrumental variable solution, I use a double indicator solution, as suggested in
Wooldridge (2002). Rewriting equation (2.18), explicitly including the omitted variable qrt, the
attractiveness of region r in year t, yields:
ln yijrt = α0 + α1 ln Kijrt + α2 ln Lijrt + α3 ln Mijrt(2.19)
+β ln PILjrt + γ ln IIjt
+δ ln PILjrt × ln IIjt + ν ln qrt + ηi + εijrt
with E[ε|x, q] = 0, where
x = [ln K, ln L, ln M, ln PIL, ln II, ln PIL× ln II].
Instead of putting ln qrt in the error term and instrumenting for PIL, I choose two indicators for
qrt. The first indicator will substitute for qrt in (2.19), and the second one will be used to instrument
for the first one. The two indicators must be redundant in (2.19) and correlated with qrt.
The first indicator of qrt is regional GDP, and can be written:
(2.20) ln GDPrt = δ0 + δ1 ln qrt + a1ijrt
with δ1 6= 0, Cov(q, a1) = 0 and Cov(x, a1) = 0 by assumption. Rearranging, we get





ln GDPrt − 1
δ1
a1ijrt.
Now GDP and a1 are correlated, and substituting for the above expression of ln qrt in (2.19)
requires that we instrument for GDPrt. We therefore introduce a second indicator of qrt, regional
population density:
(2.22) ln denrt = ρ0 + ρ1 ln qrt + a2ijrt
with ρ1 6= 0, Cov(q, a2) = 0 and Cov(x, a2) = 0. I further assume that Cov(a1, a2) = 0.
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The structural equation (2.19) becomes:
ln yijrt = (α0 − ν δ0
δ1
) + α1 ln Kijrt + α2 ln Lijrt + α3 ln Mijrt(2.23)
+β ln PILjrt + γ ln IIjt




ln GDPrt + ηi − ν
δ1
a1 + εijrt.
Although it is still doubtful whether den satisfies the exclusion restriction, it is orthogonal to
the error term: den is uncorrelated with ε since it is redundant in (2.19), and it is also uncorrelated
with a1 since both q and a2 are uncorrelated with a1 by assumption. Therefore we use ln den as an
instrumental variable for ln GDP in (2.23).
Autocorrelated standard errors
For three main reasons, we may suspect that the errors are serially correlated. The first reason
is the length of our panel (8 years, with the average number of years per firm being 4.9), and the
second, that we suspect serial correlation in our measure of PIL within a region-industry group.
The third reason is that the dependent variable, firm output, is also likely to be serially correlated.
This can lead to understating the standard errors.
I evaluate the magnitude of this issue. The serial correlation in PIL is 0.18 and that of output is
0.22. I also estimate the autocorrelation of errors, by regressing the standard errors on their lagged
values. The correlation at a one-period lag is 0.14, which is different enough from -0.5 and therefore
means a rejection of the assumption that standard errors are serially uncorrelated. At a two-period
lag, the correlation is -0.08.
Following one of the solutions suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), I aggregate
the data into two periods and run the OLS regression on a two-period panel. Although Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) suggest three methods, this one is the simplest. I choose 1997 as
the cutoff year, it being the year when manufacturing imports from the EU obtained full and free
access into Hungary. The two periods are therefore 1995-1997 and 1998-2002.
Moulton correction
The dependent variable is at the firm level, while some of the explanatory variables are at a
more aggregated level. As shown by Moulton (1990), using standard OLS would underestimate
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the standard errors if the latter are correlated within region-industry-year groups. To avoid this, I
cluster the standard errors by region-industry-year groups.
Levinsohn-Petrin productivity estimation
Finally, the input coefficients obtained when estimating a production function by the ordinary
least squares method are likely to be biased, due to the endogeneity of the input use. The coefficient
on capital is likely to be underestimated, and the coefficients on labor and materials overestimated.
I propose to correct these biases using the Levinsohn-Petrin methodology. I choose this method over
Olley and Pakes because of the poor quality of the capital variable (and therefore of the data on
investment) and because data on intermediate materials was available.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Basic specification
The results of the basic OLS model are presented in column (3) of Table 2.6. As predicted, the
coefficient on the interaction between imports and input linkages is negative, and it is significant at
the 5% level. In order to understand the economic significance of the estimates, I can compute the
partial effect of potential input linkages on firm output:9 when imports of inputs are at their mean
value, a 1% increase in potential input linkages yields a 1.6% increase in output, and when imports
of inputs are near their minimum value, the corresponding increase in output is about 6%.
2.4.2 Corrections for endogeneity and serially correlated standard errors
Column (4) reports the results of the double-indicator method. I also obtain a negative and
significant coefficient on the interaction term. Again we can interpret the coefficients in the following
way: when imports of inputs are at their mean value, a 1% increase in potential input linkages
yields a 5.3% increase in output. As expected, this corrects upwards the estimates obtained from
the standard procedure (column (3)).
Finally, the tentative correction to the correlated standard errors problem is shown in column
(5). After collapsing the dataset into two time periods, we are left with 1874 observations. Although
I again obtain a negative coefficient on the interaction term, it is no longer significant. These results
could mean that the standard errors in the basic model were indeed underestimated, or they could
be due to a poor collapsing of the data into two arbitrary periods.
9I compute 0.623− 0.031× ln (II).
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Table 2.6 and the robustness checks are done on the pooled dataset. However it makes more
sense to analyze industry-level production functions. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 respectively show results
of specifications (1) and (3) (fixed effects model) for individual industries. The coefficient on the
interaction term is negative for all industries but one, although it is significant only for industry 7
(Machinery and Equipment).
2.4.3 Robustness checks
Table 2.9 presents the basic OLS results for the first and the last quartiles of firms by size. We
see that the results still hold for the sub-sample of small firms, which tends to refute the objection
that the results were driven by large firms attracting many input firms.
Table 2.10 presents again the basic model, run on the two capital regions and on the rest of the
country separately. We see that the result seems to be driven not by firms in the capital regions
with high potential input linkages (see Table 2.11 for summary statistics) but by firms in the rest
of the country, where firm location is driven by other factors.
Finally, I check the robustness of the estimates to the exclusion of outliers. To this effect, I
remove firms which have observations in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution of TFP. We are
left with 6060 observations, or 93% or our initial sample. Table 2.12 shows that this truncation of
the sample has very little impact on mean values of input linkages and imports of inputs. The results
in Table 2.13 correspond to the first three columns of Table 2.6. The production function estimates
are robust. The estimates for elements of TFP (input linkages, imports and their interaction) are
also similar in magnitude, sign and significance to those found on the whole sample, and the overall
effect of a 1% increase in potential input linkages found at the mean value of imports of inputs is
now slightly higher, at 2.7%.
2.4.4 Levinsohn-Petrin productivity estimation
I finally estimate one value-added production function by industry, using the Levinsohn-Petrin
method. The production function coefficients for each industry are shown in table 2.14. As a check of
the validity of the LP estimates, Table 2.15 shows the corresponding estimates obtained using OLS.
These have the expected biases, with the capital coefficient having a negative bias for all industries
except 5 and 8, and the labor coefficient having a positive bias for all industries.
I then regress ln productivity on ln potential input linkages, ln import of inputs and their
interaction term (as well as a firm fixed effect). The results are shown in Table 2.16. Again I
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find a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term, meaning that an increase in the
import of inputs has lowered the contribution of input linkages to productivity.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the trade and productivity literature by investigating the changing
impact of input linkages on productivity. It departs from usual studies of trade liberalization by
concentrating on the role of imported inputs on firm productivity, and their interaction with the
availability of local inputs. It offers a theoretical explanation for why input linkages should contribute
less to firm productivity as trade is liberalized. The empirical results are fairly robust and match
the predictions.
Although input linkages are highly endogenous and firm location and performance are subject to
cumulative causation, the empirical analysis manages to circumvent these issues by using a panel of
firms with constant location. The paper also deals with omitted variable bias in which the underlying
attractiveness of a firm’s region may explain firm performance.
The results are in line with the intuition and with the predictions of the model: the posi-
tive impact of high input linkages on firm productivity declines as trade of intermediates used as
inputs by this industry increases. This is robust to corrections for omitted variable bias and endo-
geneity. This result is maintained in both the OLS and Levinsohn-Petrin methods of production
function estimation. A future improvement to the empirical methodology will consist in adapting
the Levinsohn-Petrin method to this set-up where input linkages enter TFP.
From a broader perspective, these empirical results lend support to theoretical models of economic
geography which predict that trade liberalization causes economic activity to spread in space in the
country that opens to trade. We see that if a firm’s productivity is no longer enhanced by proximity
to local inputs, it may have an incentive to relocate away from an industrial cluster. The results
therefore shed light on the mechanism through which trade liberalization can cause the decline of
old industrial centers. This decline may be both welcome (because it means a more even repartition
of economic activity and less congestion) and dreaded. Either way it must be taken into account by
policy makers when evaluating the impact of trade liberalization.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary statistics by region
























Table 2.2: Summary statistics by industry
Industry Mean operating revenue N
(thousand constant HUF)
15 Food products and beverages 10152 1034
16 Tobacco products 6375 6
17 Textiles 3822 188
18 Wearing apparel, fur 11665 213
19 Leather, luggage, footwear 7156 55
20 Wood and cork products 3244 232
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 5370 165
22 Publishing, printing 3802 392
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 88569 11
24 Chemicals and chemical products 23119 339
25 Rubber and plastic products 4274 546
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 7175 297
27 Basic metals 27701 190
28 Fabricated metal products 3268 1039
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 8051 618
30 Office machinery and computers 8834 47
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 9888 282
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 32366 203
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 4834 154
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 99062 197
35 Other transport equipment 7851 44
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 3667 250
Total 11607 6502
Table 2.3: Manufacturing industries
Number Name NACE industries
1 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco prod-
ucts
15,16
2 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products 17-19
3 Manufacture of wood and paper products, printing 20-22
4 Chemical industry 23-25
5 Other non-metallic mineral products 26
6 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 27,28
7 Machinery and equipment 29-35
8 Manufacturing n.e.c. 36-37
Table 2.4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Potential input linkages 0.0156 0.0166 0.0001 0.0740 6,502
Imports of inputs 315,269,328 162,095,903 76,728,432 714,649,408 6,502
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Table 2.5: Mean potential input linkages and imports by firm size category
Quartile Potential input linkages Imports of inputs N
1 0.0178 3.39e+08 1623
2 0.0153 3.32e+08 1627
3 0.0157 3.11e+08 1623
4 0.0135 2.78e+08 1629
Total 0.0156 3.15e+08 6502
Table 2.6: Production function OLS regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln capital 0.039** 0.045** 0.044** 0.026* 0.064**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.025)
Ln labor 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 0.193*** 0.082***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.010) (0.023)
Ln materials 0.723*** 0.724*** 0.724*** 0.717*** 0.808***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.010) (0.023)
Ln potential input link-
ages
0.038 0.623** 0.934*** 0.349
(ln PIL) (0.036) (0.293) (0.337) (0.490)
Ln import of inputs -0.037 -0.177** -0.417** -0.116
(ln II) (0.023) (0.072) (0.166) (0.115)




Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.809
N 6502 6502 6502 6502 1874
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Clustered standard errors.
Table 2.7: Production functions by industry (OLS)
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln capital -0.015 0.024 0.148*** -0.053 0.132* 0.071 0.070** 0.109***
(0.032) (0.029) (0.046) (0.049) (0.073) (0.044) (0.034) (0.029)
Ln labor 0.179*** 0.399*** 0.172*** 0.282*** 0.356* 0.172*** 0.136 0.030
(0.046) (0.041) (0.049) (0.066) (0.181) (0.045) (0.094) (0.048)
Ln materials 0.719*** 0.533*** 0.585*** 0.613*** 0.624*** 0.710*** 0.825*** 0.786***
(0.057) (0.046) (0.102) (0.068) (0.211) (0.069) (0.078) (0.040)
R2 0.816 0.909 0.787 0.788 0.864 0.767 0.829 0.831
N 1040 456 789 896 297 1229 1545 250
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Clustered standard errors.
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Table 2.8: Production functions with interaction, by industry (OLS)
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln capital -0.018 0.043 0.151*** -0.022 0.118* 0.062 0.058* 0.166***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.051) (0.051) (0.064) (0.044) (0.033) (0.039)
Ln labor 0.179*** 0.385*** 0.167*** 0.279*** 0.373* 0.174*** 0.140 0.033
(0.046) (0.043) (0.048) (0.063) (0.195) (0.045) (0.095) (0.044)
Ln materials 0.719*** 0.539*** 0.586*** 0.614*** 0.615*** 0.706*** 0.818*** 0.774***
(0.056) (0.043) (0.101) (0.067) (0.221) (0.069) (0.081) (0.040)
Ln PIL 0.641 1.908 -0.341 0.159 1.158 1.764 2.040*** 0.676
(0.952) (1.217) (1.050) (0.587) (1.288) (1.233) (0.690) (1.514)
Ln II -0.138 -0.686* 0.122 -0.160 -0.207 -0.371 -0.383** -0.378
(0.267) (0.393) (0.282) (0.130) (0.354) (0.247) (0.188) (0.364)
Ln PIL X ln II -0.031 -0.096 0.027 -0.004 -0.052 -0.100 -0.106*** -0.036
(0.048) (0.063) (0.052) (0.030) (0.066) (0.068) (0.037) (0.075)
Firm fixed ef-
fect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.817 0.912 0.789 0.794 0.865 0.770 0.830 0.839
N 1040 456 789 896 297 1229 1545 250
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Clustered standard errors.
Table 2.9: Comparison of small and large firms
Small Large
Ln capital 0.071* 0.065**
(0.040) (0.032)
Ln labor 0.102*** 0.185***
(0.034) (0.068)
Ln materials 0.779*** 0.721***
(0.055) (0.067)
Ln potential input linkages 2.277* 0.357
(1.171) (0.436)
Ln import of inputs -0.475* -0.106
(0.245) (0.109)
Ln PIL X ln II -0.117* -0.015
(0.063) (0.022)
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes
R2 0.770 0.849
N 1506 1690
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Clustered standard errors.
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Table 2.10: Regional comparison
Budapest and Pest Rest of the country
Ln capital 0.048* 0.026
(0.028) (0.025)
Ln labor 0.102* 0.247***
(0.054) (0.042)
Ln materials 0.732*** 0.723***
(0.046) (0.051)
Ln potential input linkages 0.126 1.548***
(0.885) (0.581)
Ln import of inputs -0.035 -0.459***
(0.152) (0.164)
Ln PIL X ln II -0.002 -0.082***
(0.046) (0.030)
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes
R2 0.814 0.809
N 2424 4078
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Clustered standard errors.
Table 2.11: Potential input linkages and imports in Budapest and Pest vs. all other regions
Region Potential input linkages Imports of inputs N
Budapest and Pest 0.0328 3.17e+08 2424
Rest of the country 0.0054 3.14e+08 4078
Total 0.0156 3.15e+08 6502
Table 2.12: Potential input linkages and imports after exclusion of outliers
Potential input linkages Imports of inputs N
0.0157 3.15e+08 6060
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Table 2.13: Exclusion of outliers
(1) (2) (3)
Ln capital 0.018** 0.026*** 0.025**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Ln labor 0.170*** 0.168*** 0.168***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Ln materials 0.746*** 0.748*** 0.747***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)




Ln import of inputs -0.040*** -0.149***
(0.015) (0.053)
Ln PIL X ln II -0.024**
(0.010)
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.913 0.913 0.914
N 6060 6060 6060
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Clustered standard
errors.
Table 2.14: Value-added production functions by industry (Levinsohn-Petrin)
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln capital 0.040 0.149 0.125** 0.147** 0.106 0.413*** 0.328*** 0.133
(0.081) (0.090) (0.061) (0.069) (0.099) (0.079) (0.063) (0.138)
Ln labor 0.442*** 0.629*** 0.390*** 0.451*** 0.452*** 0.389*** 0.348*** 0.389***
(0.055) (0.059) (0.068) (0.051) (0.063) (0.052) (0.041) (0.140)
N 1029 450 784 883 296 1216 1525 248
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
Table 2.15: Value added production functions by industry (OLS)
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln capital -0.072 0.091* 0.115** -0.084* 0.174** 0.177*** 0.284*** 0.273***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.044) (0.045) (0.086) (0.051) (0.051) (0.065)
Bias v. LP - - - - + - - +
Ln labor 0.721*** 0.850*** 0.580*** 0.678*** 0.867*** 0.700*** 0.645** 0.418***
(0.075) (0.070) (0.076) (0.086) (0.070) (0.095) (0.105) (0.116)
Bias v. LP + + + + + + + +
N 1029 450 784 883 296 1216 1525 248
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 2.16: OLS regression of LP productivity estimates
(1)
Ln potential input linkages -0.396***
(ln PIL) (0.115)
Ln import of inputs -0.764***
(ln II) (0.249)
Ln PIL X ln II -0.190***
(0.054)
Firm fixed effect Yes
R2 0.0067
N 6431
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** sig-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.4: Second derivative
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CHAPTER III
Trade liberalization and the geographical concentration of
industries
3.1 Introduction
Trade liberalization is usually evaluated in terms of national performance indicators: economic
growth, industry or firm-level productivity, wages. However its sub-national consequences are also
important. More specifically, industries may geographically concentrate or spread because trade re-
orientation or liberalization impacts the sub-national location of industries by altering the balance
of dispersion and concentration forces and by modifying the patterns of market and supplier access.
Whether it is beneficial for industries to concentrate or spread depends on the initial conditions
in the country. If, before trade liberalization, the country initially had an economic center that
contained a large share of the economy, the spread of industries might be desirable as it would
relieve congestion. Geographically concentrated industries also make regions more vulnerable to
asymmetric shocks. As regional specialization is often the counterpart of industry localization, a
shock to a given industry would have a disproportionate effect on the welfare of the region where this
industry is localized. On the other hand, the existence of industrial networks is considered desirable
as policy makers tend to give incentives for firms in a same industry to agglomerate in order to
benefit from localization economies such as labor pooling, intra-industry linkages, or technological
spillovers. In the presence of powerful industrial networks, further geographical concentration (also
called clustering) of industries is considered desirable.
In this paper I determine the impact of external trade on the sub-national concentration of
industries using the case of Hungary in the period following the Europe Agreement. Hungary is
a particularly interesting case because its economy was highly geographically concentrated in the
capital Budapest before the period of trade liberalization. Hungary already engaged in international
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trade with the West but it underwent a further trade liberalization with the EU-15 after the Europe
Agreement in 1991: Between 1992 and 1997 all Hungarian industrial products obtained duty-free
access to EU markets, and all manufacturing goods from the EU had full access into Hungary by
the end of 2000. This has translated into a surge in trade flows with the EU, particularly after 1997.
During the period of observation (1995-2002), overall manufacturing has spread, but the situation
is more complex at the industry level, with some industries becoming more concentrated and others
spreading. The share of Budapest county has also decreased for most industries. It is therefore
relevant to ask to what extent trade liberalization has impacted the geographical concentration of
industries in Hungary, and has caused spreading away from the capital.
The impact on the geographical concentration of the economy as a whole or of individual indus-
tries are separate questions. In this paper I focus on estimating the impact of trade liberalization
on the concentration of individual industries, using sub-national data for Hungary, although I will
also be able to check the prediction for the overall economy. In order to understand the theories an-
alyzing the impact of trade on the spatial concentration of industries, it is necessary to first consider
some of the mechanisms that cause overall economic concentration. Krugman and Elizondo (1996)
develop a two-country, three-region model of new economic geography inspired by Krugman (1991),
that predicts the impact of trade liberalization on the overall concentration of the economy. In au-
tarky, a concentrated economy is maintained by strong input and output (or forward and backward)
linkages. When the closed economy opens to trade, these linkages are weakened by the availability
of foreign markets and the economy tends to spread geographically. Krugman and Elizondo (1996)
thus explain the existence of huge metropolitan centers in countries that were closed to (or had lim-
ited) international trade. The predictions are based on simulations, the results of which depend on
country-specific initial conditions. The limited empirical evidence on the subject seems to support
this result: in a cross-country study, Ades and Glaeser (1997) find that the size of the largest city
in a country is negatively correlated with its trade openness.
I now turn to predictions at the industry level. Two theories investigate the two-industry case.
The first one is a theory of regional production networks used in Hanson (1996) for the apparel
industry in Mexico during the country’s trade liberalization. In autarky, high skill increasing return
activities concentrate in the urban center (Mexico City), and low skill constant return activities
locate in the periphery. With trade liberalization, the country specializes in low skill subcontracting,
and industry therefore relocates towards the periphery (the US border). Location is determined by
access to inputs and to foreign markets (both being in the US). In autarky, the low skill activities
were present in both regions, but in the open economy they leave the urban center: the low skill
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industry therefore becomes more concentrated. So trade increases the geographical concentration of
the dispersed industry and reduces the share of the economic center in this industry’s employment,
due to changes in market access.
In our context it is important to note that the results in Hanson (1996) could also have been
brought about by the overall trade liberalization in effect in Mexico, independently of the relative
location of the economic center and the trade partner: Krugman and Elizondo (1996) show that
trade liberalization causes overall de-concentration away from the initial economic center, regardless
of the geographical location of regions and of relative market access, because international trade
reduces the importance of having local suppliers and customers nearby. In other words, trade
weakens forward and backward linkages.
The second theory is based on this idea. It is a three-region (two domestic and one foreign),
two-industry stylized theoretical model presented in chapter 18 of Fujita, Krugman, and Venables
(1999), in which the authors focus directly on evaluating the impact of external trade on the internal
geographical concentration of industries. This model is inspired by Krugman and Elizondo (1996).
The main result is that although the economy as a whole tends to spread as trade is liberalized,
individual industries become in fact more concentrated. The location of workers and production is
the result of an equilibrium between two forces: Forward and backward linkages act as a centripetal
force as firms locate in the economic center near their suppliers and customers, and final consumer
demand as well as congestion costs act as a centrifugal force. As a country opens to trade, forward
and backward linkages and final consumer demand are both weakened.1 The initial conditions
assumed in the model are that the economy is highly concentrated in the largest region (the center),
the largest region is diversified and contains most of both industries, and the smallest region (called
the periphery) is specialized in one industry (say industry 2). As trade is liberalized, international
trade provides new sources of inputs and new customers, which weakens local forward and backward
linkages. The location of firms is then driven by pre-existing intra-industry advantages such as
spillovers and labor pooling. Firms in industry 2 that were located in the core region therefore
relocate to the periphery, avoiding congestion costs while also being near other firms in industry 2.
So industry 1 remains concentrated in the core while industry 2 concentrates in the periphery. With
trade, the economy as a whole therefore becomes more spread out (as the smallest region receives
more of industry 2 and the largest region decreases in size) and each industry more geographically
concentrated. The mechanism at play here is the weakening of industrial linkages.
The prediction we can carry from the theory (in a two-industry, two-region set up) is therefore
1In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I show that trade opening weakens input-output linkages at the firm level.
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that trade increases the geographical concentration of industries. Industries that were initially
spread out leave the center and concentrate in the periphery, while industries that were initially
concentrated are expected to be less impacted by trade. Table 3.1 summarizes the predictions of
the three papers mentioned above. Only Hanson (1996) and Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999)
provide predictions at the industry level, that individual industries that were initially dispersed
should become more concentrated, which I will test using Hungarian data. All three models make
predictions on the concentration of the economy as a whole, predicting that the economy should
spread2 and the share of the economic center should decrease.
Although Hanson (1996) and Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) make a clear prediction in
terms of the geographical concentration of industries during trade liberalization, this is not directly
testable empirically. Firstly, the theoretical models say nothing when there are more than two
industries. Secondly, the relation between trade and geographical concentration identified in Fujita,
Krugman, and Venables (1999), like most relationships in new economic geography models, is highly
nonlinear: the pattern of production will at some point jump discontinuously between concentration
in one region and a symmetric equilibrium with equal repartition across regions. As Head and Mayer
(2004) pointed out, if we are to take this prediction literally, this means that a linear regression would
be misspecified.
For these reasons, instead of trying to estimate these theoretical predictions directly, this paper
aims to answer the question empirically. I will be estimating the relation between trade and the
spatial concentration of industries (column 2 of Table 3.1) and the relation between trade and the
share of the economic center (Budapest) in an industry. I control for other determinants of industry
localization that have been highlighted in the prior empirical literature, as well as for industry
fixed effects. Regressions of the Krugman index of industrial concentration on industry exports and
imports of inputs reveal that exports increase the geographical concentration of industries, and more
so for industries that were initially dispersed.
The empirical literature on economic integration and industry concentration has given mixed
results. Most of the literature has focused on concentration patterns over time, or on estimating
the determinants of industrial concentration. Conclusions may depend on whether the papers look
at industry concentration patterns across countries or across regions within countries. Brulhart
(2001) finds a slight increase in industrial concentration across countries in Europe in time, while
others find decreasing trends (Aiginger and Davies (2004), Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman, Redding,
2Hanson (1996) deals with production networks, we should therefore see this as spreading of a production network
rather than of the whole economy.
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and Venables (2002)). Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman, Redding, and Venables (2002) use Gini co-
efficients of industrial concentration for 36 manufacturing industries across EU countries, for four
periods between 1970 and 1997, and find that patterns of geographical concentration vary greatly
across industries and over time. Overall, concentration is decreasing for 24 of the 26 industries.
Brulhart (2001)’s contrasting results may be due to the fact that he excludes certain countries due
to data limitations and compares concentration patterns in 1972 and 1996 while Midelfart-Knarvik,
Overman, Redding, and Venables (2002) look at several time averages between 1970 and 1997.
The literature investigating the determinants of the geographical concentration of industries
began with Kim (1995). He computes Gini indices for US industries and regresses these on industry
characteristics, notably the average firm size in the industry as a proxy for returns to scale and
the share of raw materials used in the industry as a proxy for the role of input-output linkages.
He also includes industry and year fixed effects in order to remedy the fact that many variables
are omitted, notably the spatial distribution of factors and trade variables such as capital and
labor intensities. He finds that both returns to scale and linkages positively affect the degree of
industrial concentration in the US. A similar study by Amiti (1999) using Gini coefficients for 65
manufacturing industries in Europe also finds positive effects of returns to scale and linkages. The
empirical evidence on the determinants of the geographical concentration of industries is summarized
in Combes and Overman (2004): there is little evidence that labor, capital or resources intensity
increases concentration, and mixed evidence on the effect of demand and cost linkages as well as
trade liberalization. There is positive evidence that technology intensive and high returns to scale
industries are more concentrated.
Finally, there are very few papers looking for subnational effects of external trade liberalization.
A notable example is Overman and Winters (2003), who analyze the impact of the accession of
the United Kingdom into the EU on the location of industries in the United Kingdom. They find
evidence of relocation towards the South East, caused by market access to mainland Europe.
The next section describes the international trade patterns observed during the period, and
section 3 how the geographical concentration of industries has evolved. Section 4 estimates the
effect of trade on industrial concentration. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Trade patterns
Hungary already engaged in international trade with the West but it underwent a further trade
liberalization after the Europe Agreement in 1991, which was accelerated after the Copenhagen
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Council of 1993. A ten year schedule for the lowering of tariffs and quotas was set up between
Hungary and the EU. As early as 1992, some industrial products could be exported to the EU duty-
free, and by early 1995 all industrial products except textiles and steel benefited from full duty-free
access. Steel obtained free access at the beginning of 1996, and textile products at the beginning
of 1997. This trade liberalization was asymmetric in the sense that imports into Hungary from the
EU obtained free access with a time lag: all manufacturing goods from the EU had full access into
Hungary by the end of 2000.
This trade policy change began when Hungary was coming out of a deep recession, which lasted
from 1990 until 1993, as illustrated in Appendix 2. This seems to have caused a delay in the impact
of the policy on trade flows with the EU, which is why I focus the analysis on the period 1995-2002.
Between 1995 and 2002 both the volume of trade with the EU and the share of the EU in Hungarian
exports greatly increased. Exports to the EU increased by 220% between 1995 and 2002 in real terms
(while GDP increased by 31%), and imports from the EU increased by 135%. The share of exports
to the EU in total Hungarian exports increased from 63% in 1995 to 76% in 1999, while the share
of imports from the EU remained rather stable, increasing from 60% in 1995 to 64% in 1999, then
decreasing to 56% in 2002. Looking at manufactured goods only, 90% of exports went to the EU in
1999. Figure 3.1 shows the total import and export flows with the EU-15, in 1992 Hungarian Forints
deflated by import and export PPI (base 100 in 1992). They have roughly quadrupled between 1992
and 2002, with a sharp rise after 1997. The process of trade integration was therefore both rapid
and deep.
I now consider the trade patterns at the industry level. I use import and export flows with
the EU, from the OECD’s STAN Bilateral Trade database, for 18 manufacturing industries. Most
of these industries correspond to a single two-digit NACE industry (equivalent to ISIC Rev. 3.3),
however some combine two or three two-digit industries. Table 3.2 indicates the breakdown of
manufacturing into these 18 industries which will be used for the analysis throughout the paper,
and which two-digit NACE industries they correspond to.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present respectively the industry-level import and export flows adjusted by
industry value added.3 We can see that there is considerable variation in trade patterns across
industries. Exports of textiles, leather and footwear have more than tripled between 1992 and 2002,
and exports of office, accounting and computing machinery have increased by a multiple of seven,
while the exports of several industries have in fact decreased (food products, beverages and tobacco,
3I deflate trade flows by industry value added rather than industry-level GDP because of the high proportion of
re-exports in the Hungarian economy. The source of the value added data is the OECD’s STAN Industry database.
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wood and products of wood and cork, and basic metals for instance). There is less variation in
import patterns, as import flows deflated by value added have decreased for almost all industries,
although they have increased in value terms (in constant Hungarian Forints).
3.3 Industry concentration patterns
3.3.1 Measuring geographical concentration
Having identified variation in the industry-level trade patterns, I now check if this was accompa-
nied by changes in the geographical concentration of industries. I first consider various measures of
concentration, before focusing on the Krugman concentration index for the empirical analysis, and
I finally present the patterns.
In order to measure the geographical concentration of industries, I use region-industry employ-
ment data for the period 1995-2002 from the Hungarian Labor Force Survey. The regions are the 20
Hungarian counties (NUTS3 level of geographical aggregation). These data can be used to compute
different measures of geographical concentration.
A simple measure is given by the geographical Herfindahl index, the sum of the squared shares
of regions r in the employment of industry j. However the main drawback of this measure is that it
assumes that regions have equal sizes, which is far from being the case in Hungary. In contrast three
other measures, the locational Gini coefficient, the Krugman concentration index and the Ellison
and Glaeser index, which I discuss below, are more appropriate as they have the advantage of taking
into account the underlying regional repartition of the economy.
A second possible measure, the Theil index of inequality, from the class of generalized entropy
indices, is particularly useful compared to other measures because it is additively decomposable.4














where i ∈ {1...N} denotes basic spatial units of equal size (regions differ in their number of basic





The decomposability of this index is a useful feature if one wishes to compare the within-country
and the between-country components of economic concentration or to decompose overall economic
concentration in a country into industry-level components. However this is not the focus of this
4See Brulhart and Traeger (2005) who use this index to account for geographical concentration patterns in Europe.
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paper. An important drawback of the additive decomposability feature is that there is no benchmark
of equality attached to the entropy index. In our context it is crucial to use a measure of geographical
concentration that takes into account at least the underlying distribution of manufacturing,5 so this
class of indices does not match the trade models as well as the locational Gini, the Krugman index
or the Ellison and Glaeser index.
I now turn to the locational Gini coefficient. Computing the locational Gini coefficient for






where lr is employment in region r and L is total manufacturing employment. Therefore rjr is the
share of region r in industry j normalized by the share of region r in manufacturing.
For a given industry j, the distribution of rjr across regions r is an indication of the localization
(or geographical concentration) of this industry. The locational Gini coefficient summarizes this
distribution: it is twice the area between the Lorenz curve associated with the location indices and
the 45◦ line. The Lorenz curve ranks regions in ascending order of their location index and plots
cumulated values of ljr/lj against cumulated values of lr/L. The Gini coefficient therefore takes value
zero if for each region r, the share of r in industry j is equal to the share of r in manufacturing.
Therefore the benchmark of no concentration is that the repartition of industry j across regions is
the same as that of overall manufacturing. High values of the Gini coefficient mean that an industry
is geographically concentrated compared to the overall economy.
In the Gini coefficient, the impact of transfers across regions is determined by the rankings of
regions in the distribution of region-industry employment. If two regions keep the same employment
of a given industry but more regions appear in between these two employment levels, this would
change the Gini coefficient. Moreover, the associated Lorenz curves cross if over time industry shares
ljr/l
j decline both in low and high share regions, with an ambiguous effect on overall concentration.
A main drawback of the Gini coefficient - as well as of all the other measures - is that it does
not take into account the underlying industrial structure. Some industries may be geographically
concentrated just because they have a small number of establishments, as pointed out by Ellison
and Glaeser (1997). The Ellison and Glaeser index has the advantage of also taking into account the
underlying concentration level of the industry. However implementation of the Ellison and Glaeser
index requires that we know the Herfindahl index of industrial concentration, which is not available
5For a more detailed discussion of the main criteria for a desirable index of geographical concentration, see Combes
and Overman (2004). For a more technical discussion of inequality measures, see Sen (1997) and Atkinson (1998).
40
and may not make much sense at this rather broad level of disaggregation (Ellison and Glaeser
(1997) use 4-digit level data). I am therefore not able to use this index in this paper.








is the employment share of industry j in region r and sj = l
j
L is the employment
share of industry j in manufacturing. This index takes values between 0 and 2, and is equal to zero if
for each location r the share of industry j is equal to the share of j in manufacturing. The benchmark
of no concentration is therefore the same as for the Gini coefficient, that industry j ’s repartition
across the regions maps that of manufacturing as a whole. High values of the Krugman index also
indicate that the repartition of industry j across locations departs from that of manufacturing as a
whole.
I rule out the Gini coefficient in favor of the Krugman index because the latter is more adapted
to the trade models. The Gini coefficient is rather a measure of inequality and it is sensitive to
changes in the rankings of regions through transfers between the two ends of the distribution.6
3.3.2 The patterns
The level of geographical aggregation used in this paper is NUTS3, corresponding to the 20
Hungarian counties. The situation in 1995 and historically was one of strong economic concentration
in the capital Budapest, which makes Hungary a good subject for this analysis. A political map of
Hungary is given in Appendix 3. Figure 3.4 plots the regional shares of manufacturing against the
rank of each region in manufacturing in 1995, for 1995 (dots) and 2002 (crosses). Focusing on the
dots we can see that in 1995 the distribution of regional shares was very skewed towards Budapest
(rank 1) and Pest (the region around Budapest, ranked 2), and that the economy was therefore
highly concentrated in the capital. Budapest county alone (the smallest of 20 counties, accounting
for only 0.5% of the total area) accounted for 17% of manufacturing employment in 1995.
In line with the predictions in Krugman and Elizondo (1996), overall manufacturing has spread
during the period: Comparing the distributions of regional manufacturing shares in 1995 and 2002
in Figure 3.4, we can also see that by 2002 (shown by the crosses) there had been some degree of
convergence in the regional shares of manufacturing, with Budapest’s share in manufacturing falling
6The Gini coefficient is often used to measure income inequality, as in Garner and Terrell (1997) and Gottschalk
and Smeeding (1997).
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to 15% in 2002 and the shares of the lower ranked regions increasing. Moreover the Herfindahl index
of geographical concentration for overall manufacturing decreased slightly, from 0.0694 to 0.0655
between 1995 and 2002.
The situation is more complex at the industry level. Figure 3.5 plots the Krugman concentration
index for each industry in 2002 against that in 1995. Out of 18 industries, 4 exhibited the same level of
concentration in 2002 as in 1995, 6 had higher concentration in 2002, and 8 had lower concentration.
I now take a closer look at the evolution of the employment share of the capital region (Budapest
county) in each industry. Figure 3.6 shows that the share of Budapest has decreased for almost all
industries.
To conclude on these concentration patterns, the reduction in the concentration of overall man-
ufacturing seems to give support to Krugman and Elizondo (1996), Fujita, Krugman, and Venables
(1999) and Hanson (1996). However we see that the patterns of industry concentration are more
complex, and I now turn to the econometric analysis of the relationship between trade and the
geographical concentration of industries.
3.4 Testing for the relationship between trade and geographical concen-
tration
The intuition we carry from the stylized models presented in Section 1 is that increased trade
makes industries that were initially spread out leave the center and concentrate in the periphery,
and industries that were initially concentrated are expected to be less impacted. However, as stated
earlier there are factors other than international trade that affect the geographical concentration of
industries. Since there is empirical evidence that geographical concentration is positively correlated
with the degree of returns to scale in an industry, I control for returns to scale using average plant
size in the industry. Moreover, the starting up of large FDI ventures is also likely to explain part of
the changes in industry concentration in Hungary. Bearing this in mind, I will also control for FDI
stock in the industry.
I therefore test the impact of international trade on the spatial concentration of industries by
regressing the log of the Krugman coefficient of industry j in year t on log industry exports and
log of imported inputs for that industry, controlling for log returns to scale and log FDI as well as
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industry fixed effects. I estimate the following equation:
ln KCjt = α1 ln Exports
j









Since the insight from theory is that international trade affects industry concentration through
the possibility of exporting and the access to foreign inputs, I include separately ln Exportsjt , the
log of industry-level value added adjusted exports to the EU, and ln IIjt , the log of the measure of
imported inputs from the EU. The source of trade flow and value added data is the OECD, as in
Section 2.





where V Akt is value added of industry k in year t and Ikj is industry j’s share of inputs coming
from industry k (from the input-output matrix published by the Hungarian Statistical Institute).
So imported inputs are the sum of import flows of all industries weighted by their share in industry
j’s inputs.
FDIjt is deflated FDI stock for industry j in year t, in million Euros deflated by investment
deflators. These data are from the Hungarian National Bank and cover only the years 1998 to 2002.
ln Scalejt is the log of average plant size in industry j in year t in terms of employment, a
proxy for industry-level returns to scale. The source of the plant size data is the Hungarian Labor
Force Survey. Industry fixed effects, δj , are included to control for all time-invariant industry
characteristics and omitted variables such as industry structure, the location and concentration of
relevant endowments, and the time-invariant component of intra-industry linkages.
Table 3.3 gives summary statistics of the variables. The Krugman index varies greatly from
0.07 for industry 12 (Office, accounting and computing machinery) in 1995 to 1.56 for industry
2 (Textile, leather and footwear) in 1998. FDI and Exports are positively correlated with the
Krugman index, while imports of inputs are practically uncorrelated with the Krugman index and
negatively correlated with exports. Average plant scale is negatively correlated with the degree of
concentration.7
Table 3.4 reports the results from the baseline regression of ln KC on the explanatory variables.
7This feature of the data goes against previous empirical findings, however it is robust to the use of two alternative
measures of returns to scale: the median and the average plant size from the Amadeus dataset.
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The results in column 1, without taking returns to scale or FDI stock into account, indicate that a
1% increase in exports increases the Krugman coefficient by 32%, whereas imports of inputs seem
to reduce concentration. The coefficients on Scale and FDI are not statistically significant from
zero (columns 2-4). However the regressions including FDI contain fewer observations as the data
on FDI are available for only five years. In order to check whether using a reduced sample makes a
difference, I show in columns 5 and 6 the same regressions as in columns 1 and 2 respectively, with
the reduced sample. The results on columns 3-6 indicate that the inclusion of Scale and FDI does
not change the coefficients on exports and imports of inputs much. So a 1% increase in exports leads
to an increase in the Krugman index of 23-26% based on the reduced sample and 32% based on the
full sample, whereas imports of inputs have a negative effect, which does not appear significant in
the reduced sample.
In Table 3.5, I estimate the same model with a one-year lag on the independent variables. We
can indeed expect trade flows and FDI to have a lagged effect on the geographical concentration of
industries. The columns in Table 3.5 report the same regressions as the first four columns in Table
3.4. The results are very similar to those of the model without lags, with a positive effect of exports
that however does not remain significant after I include Scale and FDI.
I now check whether the effect of trade is stronger for industries that were less geographically
concentrated in 1995, as suggested by the theory. In Table 3.6, the ‘high concentration’ industries
are the five industries with a Krugman index in the top 25 percent in 1995 (industries 1, 2, 6, 8
and 9), and the ‘low concentration’ industries are the five industries with a 1995 Krugman index
in the bottom 25 percent (industries 5, 12, 14, 15 and 17). Comparing columns 1 and 3, we see
that the coefficient on exports is higher for high concentration industries, however once I introduce
the full set of variables (columns 2 and 4) we have an effect of exports and imports of inputs not
statistically different from zero for high concentration industries and a coefficient on exports that is
large, positive and significant for low concentration industries. These results reinforce the previous
results that trade positively impacts the geographical concentration of industries through export
flows, and that most of the effect is seen among industries that were initially dispersed.
The theory tells us that with an increase in trade, industries that were not initially concentrated
in the economic center will concentrate away from the economic center, and industries that were
concentrated in the economic center will maintain that concentration. I test this by using the
share of Budapest in industry employment as the dependent variable, and by isolating two groups of
industries. The group of industries with a high employment share of Budapest are the five industries
that were in the top 25 percent in terms of their share of Budapest in 1995 (industries 4, 6, 10, 14 and
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15), and the group of low share of Budapest industries are the five industries that were in the bottom
25 percent in 1995 (industries 1, 2, 5, 9 and 16). I expect the coefficients on the trade variables to be
positive or not significantly different from zero for the high Budapest share industries, and negative
for the low Budapest share industries.
Table 3.7 reports the regression results for the full sample of industries. As in Table 3.4, the last
two columns report the same specifications as columns 1 and 2 based on the reduced sample used
in columns 3 and 4. Exports have an overall negative effect on the share of the industry located in
Budapest, although this effect loses its significance after I include Scale and FDI, while imports
of inputs have a positive effect. This seems to indicate that overall, industries that experienced an
increase in their exports to the EU have also relocated away from Budapest.
The fact that exports to the EU increase the Krugman index and at the same time decrease the
share of Budapest suggests that in the case of Hungary market access has played a crucial role, as
in Hanson (1996). There is trade-induced concentration of industries accompanied by relocation of
these industries away from the economic center. This is hardly surprising as Budapest is located
away from the border with the EU. The results in Table 3.7 also indicate that exports and imports
of inputs have opposite effects on the share of Budapest: industries that experienced an increase
in their imported inputs from the EU have increasingly located in Budapest, while industries that
experienced at increase in their exports have located away from Budapest. Proximity to the client
market (near the Western part of the country, away from Budapest) therefore appears more relevant
for exports than proximity to the supplier market is for imports.
Finally, Table 3.8 presents the same specifications as the first four columns of Table 3.7 with
lagged independent variables. The results are very similar to those of the model without time lags.
Finally, Table 3.9 presents the results for the estimation on two groups of industries according to their
initial share of employment located in Budapest county. First, the coefficients on exports and imports
of inputs change with the inclusion of controls for scale and FDI. If we focus on the full specification
(columns 2 and 4), we see that as predicted the effect of the trade variables is insignificant for the
industries that had a high share of employment in Budapest, while it is significant for the industries
with a low share in Budapest: for these industries, exports have a negative and significant effect (a
1% increase in exports decreases the share of Budapest by 0.12 points) and imports of inputs have
a positive and significant effect.
45
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has estimated the impact of international trade on the geographical concentration
of industries in Hungary following trade liberalization with the EU-15. The first set of results are
obtained by regressing the Krugman index of industrial concentration on exports, imports of inputs,
a proxy for industry returns to scale and FDI stock. Although the effects of the trade variables
are significant, the number of explanatory variables is fairly limited, which the use of industry fixed
effects partly compensates for. Moreover, the proxy for industry-level returns to scale, although
commonly used in the literature, does not have the positive and significant effect on concentration
that would be expected.
In the first set of results, exports to the EU increase the geographical concentration of industries,
particularly for industries that were initially dispersed, while imports of inputs from the EU do
not have a robust effect. Trade therefore seems to be affecting the geographical concentration of
industries mainly through exports. This effect is stronger for industries that had a low initial level
of concentration, as predicted by theory.
The second set of results is obtained by using the share of Budapest in industry employment as
the dependent variable. Increasing exports reduces the share of the capital Budapest in an industry,
and more so for industries that initially had a low share of Budapest. On the other hand, imports of
inputs from the EU increase the share of Budapest in an industry’s employment. Through the lens
of Hanson (1996), this could mean that supplier access is not relevant, as Budapest is away from the
EU border, or that inputs from the EU arrive into Hungary via the capital. Finally, combining the
two sets of results about industrial concentration and the share of Budapest tells us that increased
exports in an industry have brought about higher geographical concentration away from the capital
region. This means that trade has increased the geographical concentration of industries without
necessarily reinforcing existing industrial networks.
46
Tables and Figures













Hanson (1996) - + -
Table 3.2: Manufacturing industries
Number Name NACE / ISIC
1 Food products, beverages and tobacco 15-16
2 Textile, leather and footwear 17-19
3 Wood and products of wood and cork 20
4 Pulp, paper, printing, publishing 21-22
5 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23
6 Chemicals and chemical products 24
7 Rubber and plastic products 25
8 Other non-metallic mineral products 26
9 Basic metals 27
10 Fabricated metal products 28
11 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 29
12 Office, accounting and computing machinery 30
13 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 31
14 Radio, television and communication equipment 32
15 Medical, precision and optical instruments 33
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34
17 Other transport equipment 35
18 Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 36-37
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Mean 0.57 8.41 1.01 94.34 2.10e+11
Standard de-
viation
0.33 9.04 0.67 19.70 1.83e+11
Min 0.07 1.00 0.07 61.88 4.57e+08
Max 1.56 67.25 2.65 197.50 6.21e+11
N 144 144 144 144 90
Table 3.4: Trade flows and geographical concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln exports 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.23***
(6.64) (6.75) (3.18) (3.17) (3.19) (3.06)
Ln imports of
inputs
-0.21** -0.26*** -0.14 -0.07 -0.10 -0.04
(2.39) (2.70) (0.90) (0.42) (0.71) (0.25)
Ln scale 0.17 0.17 0.11
(1.27) (0.83) (0.60)




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.27 0.28 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
N 144 144 90 90 90 90
Dependent variable: ln KC. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at
1%level. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Table 3.5: Lagged trade flows and geographical concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln
exportst−1
0.27*** 0.28*** 0.17 0.17
(5.77) (5.85) (1.52) (1.53)
Ln imports of
inputst−1
-0.25*** -0.29*** -0.12 -0.01
(3.09) (3.25) (0.67) (0.06)
Ln scalet−1 0.13 0.24
(1.04) (0.80)




Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.26 0.27 0.05 0.06
N 126 126 72 72
Dependent variable: ln KC. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: High vs. low concentration industries
High concentration Low concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln exports 0.85*** -0.15 0.36*** 0.37**
(4.95) (0.37) (4.02) (2.69)
Ln imports of
inputs
-0.71** 0.40 -0.35** -0.64
(2.52) (0.79) (2.15) (1.25)
Ln scale 0.48* -0.65
(0.99) (0.87)




Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.56 0.50 0.39 0.35
N 40 25 40 25
Dependent variable: ln KC. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Table 3.7: Trade flows and the employment share of Budapest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln exports -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.05** -0.05**
(4.54) (4.34) (1.35) (1.36) (2.14) (2.17)
Ln imports of
inputs
0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10** 0.12** 0.13*** 0.14***
(5.85) (6.17) (4.34) (2.54) (3.21) (2.91)
Ln scale 0.09*** -0.06 0.03
(2.86) (1.03) (0.46)




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.28 0.32 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.15
N 144 144 90 90 90 90
Dependent variable: share of Budapest. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, ***
significant at 1% level. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Table 3.8: Lagged trade flows and the employment share of Budapest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln
exportst−1
-0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03 -0.03
(3.92) (3.76) (1.05) (1.08)
Ln imports of
inputst−1
0.15*** 0.14*** 0.10** 0.07
(8.29) (6.74) (2.42) (1.33)
Ln scalet−1 0.06** -0.07
(2.18) (1.04)




Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.41 0.44 0.14 0.16
N 126 126 72 72
Dependent variable: share of Budapest. * significant at 10% level, ** signifi-
cant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. Absolute value of t statistics in
parentheses.
49
Table 3.9: High vs. low Budapest share industries
High Budapest share Low Budapest share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln exports -0.07** 0.02 -0.01 -0.12**
(2.18) (0.55) (0.56) (2.59)
Ln imports of
inputs
0.25*** -0.02 0.02 0.23**
(4.77) (0.18) (0.51) (2.86)
Ln scale -0.19 0.01
(1.38) (0.15)




Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.47 0.44 0.01 0.47
N 40 25 40 25
Dependent variable: share of Budapest. * significant at 10% level, ** signifi-






















1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
year
imports in million HUF exports in million HUF
Figure 3.1: Total trade flows with the EU-15 in million HUF (base 1992), 1992-2002
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Figure 3.6: Share of Budapest county in each industry, 2002 vs. 1995
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CHAPTER IV
Trade liberalization and the size distribution of plants in
Colombia
4.1 Introduction
In this paper I ask how trade liberalization affects the size distributions of exporters and non-
exporters. I rely on various predictions that can be extracted from heterogeneous-firms trade models
and confront them with actual distributions derived from Colombian data before and after policy
changes. This can explain whether a policy that favors exporters has generated an export boom
where the largest and most productive incumbent exporters grow, or one where the bulk of the
increase in exports comes from massive entry of smaller plants into the export market. Or given
that most plants do not export, we may want to know how that population has evolved: in particular
what happens to the smallest and the largest non-exporters?
So far the literature on the distribution of firm size has focused on establishing stylized facts
about the size distribution of firms, irrespective of their exporter status. Although an implication
of Gibrat’s Law is that the distribution of firm size is lognormal,1 later models, including Simon’s
model,2 and more recent empirical evidence (such as Machado and Mata (2000), using a compre-
hensive dataset of all Portuguese firms) show that this distribution is in fact more right skewed than
the lognormal and that there does not exist a single class of distribution that fits the data across
countries and industries. Although the empirical literature so far is blind to the export status of
firms, we might however expect that the subsample of firms (or plants) that engage in exports differs
in its size distribution from the subsample of non-exporters. This is because exporters differ from
1See Gibrat (1931).
2See Ijiri and Simon (1977), and for a review of the literature on the size distribution of firms, Sutton (1997). Papers
modeling the size distribution of firms and firm dynamics in the absence of international trade include Luttmer (2004),
Luttmer (2007) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007).
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non-exporters in their characteristics, notably in terms of their age, size, and the industries they
belong to: it has been established that exporters tend to be larger, older and more productive than
non-exporters.3
I focus on analyzing the evolution of the size distribution of Colombian manufacturing plants be-
tween 1981 and 1990, in light of two heterogeneous firms models. Between 1982 and 1986, exporting
was facilitated by a depreciation of the domestic currency. This channel is similar to that operating
in the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous-firms model: the new export possibilities increase production
needs and the cost of labor, with implications for the size of surviving firms and of those who choose
to export and not to export. Simultaneously there were tariff increases, which reduced the level
of competition in the domestic market. Secondly, starting in 1985, there were also large unilateral
tariff cuts which considerably reduced the initial differences in tariffs across sectors. This increased
import competition in the sectors affected by tariff reductions, a channel explored in the Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) model.
The existing empirical literature examining the impact of international trade liberalization on
firm size has used mostly parametric estimation methods, and focused on average effects or on
effects on specific quantiles of the distribution.4 Moreover, none of the previous work seems to have
compared the impact on exporting vs. that on non-exporting firms or plants. To summarize the
empirical evidence, there is ample evidence that trade liberalization increases exit (Head and Ries
(1999), Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2008)), however there is mixed evidence regarding
the impact on plant size. The impact on plant size might depend on the kind of liberalization
observed (unilateral or bilateral tariff cuts, devaluation of the currency), and on the proportion of
plants engaged in or affected by international trade. Most of the evidence shows that greater import
competition reduces average plant size (Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo (1991), Roberts and Tybout
(1991), using panel data from the manufacturing censuses for Colombia and Chile, and Head and
Ries (1999), studying Canadian firms following CUSFTA), although the evidence on small plants is
mixed (Head and Ries (1999)), while greater export possibilities tend to increase average plant size
(Roberts and Tybout (1991)). The former finding is contrary to the predictions in the Melitz and
3See Bernard and Jensen (1999). Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) also analyze the
determinants of exporter status. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008), using French data, and Eaton, Eslava, Kugler,
and Tybout (2008), using Colombian data study the behavior of exporters in terms of their participation in individual
export markets.
4See Tybout and Westbrook (1995), Pavcnik (2002), Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2004), Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006) and Fernandes (2007) on the impact of trade liberalization on firm productivity. Taking
a different approach, Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009a) consider the implications of the size distribution of firms
for the impact of lower entry costs and trade opening on welfare, and Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009b) model the
impact of international trade on macroeconomic volatility through idiosyncratic shocks to large firms in economies
where the distribution of firm size is dominated by a few large firms.
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Ottaviano (2008) model of heterogeneous-firms that average firm size should increase in the short
run, but in accordance with the long-run prediction of a decrease in average firm size. The latter
finding is consistent with the predictions from the Melitz (2003) model.
Directly focusing on the impact of trade on the overall distribution of firm size, Nocke and Yeaple
(2006) show that in U.S. data, a reduction in shipping costs has flattened the distribution of firm size
within an industry. They summarize the distribution of firm size by the gradient of the logarithm of
firm size with respect to the logarithm of its sales rank: this gives information on the dispersion of
firm size but not on potential leftward or rightward shifts. They do not study the impact on firms
by exporter status.
To the best of my knowledge, the only paper that examines the impact of international trade
on the distribution of firm size using non-parametric methods is Machado and Mata (2000). Using
quantile regression, they find that high industry-level import intensity tends to shift the conditional
firm size distribution leftward (i.e. to make firms smaller in all centiles of the distribution), whereas
export intensity tends to shift it to the right (i.e. to make firms larger). This is consistent with the
findings in Roberts and Tybout (1991).
Finally, using the same data for Colombia that are used in this paper and in Roberts and Tybout
(1991), and analyzing the export boom between 1984 and 1991, Roberts, Sullivan, and Tybout
(1997) find that more than half of the export growth in volume came from net entry into exporting.
Incumbent exporters did not increase their export volumes much in response to devaluation. These
results, combined with those of Roberts and Tybout (1991), indicate that there would have been a
shift in the size distribution of exporters but also a change in its shape. These distributional effects
can be expected to be long lasting due to the phenomenon of “export hysteresis” that has been
documented in Colombia.5
The main results of this paper are as follows. I first find that the size distribution of exporters
is lognormal, and to the right of that of non-exporters, whereas that of non-exporters is more
right skewed than the lognormal. I then identify a distinct leftward shift in the size distribution of
exporters during a period of currency depreciation and unilateral tariff increases (period 1), which
remains later while the currency is stable and tariffs are cut drastically (period 2). In contrast,
the size distribution of non-exporters does not shift but becomes more peaked with shorter tails in
period 1, then becomes less peaked again during period 2. This is evidence in favor of predictions
derived from both heterogeneous firms models: Melitz (2003) if there is massive entry of smaller
5See Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007), who estimate entry costs into exporting to be substantial, meaning that
firms may continue to export even though their current profits may be negative.
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plants into exporting, and the long run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). I then show that
the bulk of the leftward shift in the size distribution of exporters is due to massive entry of smaller
plants into exporting, which is consistent with both models. Overall most of the results support the
predictions from Melitz (2003) as well as the long-run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
The next section summarizes the predictions that can be derived from two models of international
trade with heterogeneous-firms, and section 3 describes the data and the policy changes that occurred
during the period of observation. Section 4 tests the predictions of the models in terms of plant
dynamics and of changes in the size distributions, and section 5 refines the results obtained in
section 4 by conducting the analysis for separate groups of industries depending on industry-level
characteristics. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical predictions
In order to obtain a non-degenerate size distribution, it is necessary to depart from the represen-
tative firm framework and consider heterogeneous-firms. In the typical heterogeneous-firms trade
models, firms are ordered according to their productivity level, there is a monotonically increasing
relationship between firm size and productivity, and cut-off levels of productivity for firms to be
able to operate and to export. A decrease in the variable trade cost causes the more productive
firms (and the largest) to become or remain exporters. This increases aggregate productivity (and
average firm size), firm exit, the number of exporters, and export sales of existing exporters. The
result is that the smallest firms are the most hit by trade liberalization and the first ones to exit,
while the largest firms are able to compensate their losses on the domestic market through export
sales.
In Melitz (2003), the channel through which trade affects firm dynamics, and firm size in particu-
lar, is competition on the factor market. Due to facilitated exports, brought about by lower variable
trade costs or in the particular case studied in this paper the depreciation of the Peso, the new
production needs bid up the cost of labor, and the lowest productivity firms are forced to exit. This
model does not take into account the import competition channel brought about by import tariff
reductions. The Peso depreciation increases the productivity cut-off for operating and decreases the
productivity cut-off for exporting. This forces the smallest firms to shut down, and enables more
(and smaller) firms to become exporters. Domestic revenue shrinks for all firms, therefore non-
exporters become smaller. However it is also shown that the combined domestic and export sales of
exporters increase with trade liberalization, so exporters (new and incumbent) become larger at all
59
points of the productivity distribution.
What are the implications of Melitz (2003) in terms of the overall distribution of firms? The
total number of firms decreases. The smallest firms exit, the surviving small (domestic) firms shrink,
and the largest (exporting) firms become larger. If the surviving domestic firms represent the bulk
of the distribution (as only a small fraction of firms export) we can expect a leftward shift in the
distribution (although the right tail becomes longer). If however there is high exit and massive
entry into the export market, the number of non-exporters compared to that of exporters is greatly
reduced, and there will be a rightward shift in the distribution except for the left tail. In either case,
both tails of the distribution become thicker, the right tail becoming longer, and the distribution
should be flatter.
The distribution of non-exporters should shift left. Since both tails drop out of the distribution
(the left tail exits and the right tail become exporters), there should be more mass in the center.
Now let us consider the population of exporters. Since the incumbent exporters grow, we expect
the right tail to become longer. However the new exporters are smaller than incumbent exporters,
which should also make the left tail longer. The distribution of exporters should therefore have
greater variance and become flatter. Again, the extent of entry of smaller exporters will determine
the extent of flattening, as well as potential shifts (massive entry leading to more flattening and a
leftward shift).
In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), there is also firm heterogeneity in the form of productivity dif-
ferences, although these are modeled as production cost differences, where production costs are an
inverse function of productivity. The demand system is different: consumers have linear preferences
as in Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) instead of constant elasticity of substitution preferences
as in Melitz (2003). This framework allows for horizontal product differentiation and endogenous
markups. This results in an endogenous distribution of markups which responds to trade liberal-
ization, because trade liberalization changes the level of competition through the number of firms
operating and their productivity levels. In this model trade liberalization therefore affects firm size
through a different channel, that of increased competition on the product market. In contrast, in
Melitz (2003) the firm dynamics respond to the access to a larger market and the increase in do-
mestic factor costs. The Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model leads to a similarly tractable pattern
of production whereby only firms with cost draws below the domestic cost cut-off will operate.
Although Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) investigates several forms of trade liberalization, I only use
the predictions from the case of a unilateral liberalization, where the domestic country unilaterally
reduces its import tariffs. The model yields distinct predictions in the short run and the long run. In
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the short run, the number of firms is fixed in the home and the foreign country, while this is no longer
the case in the long run. In the short run, increased import competition in the liberalizing country
increases exit of the smallest domestic producers, so the number of firms decreases and average firm
size increases. The variance of firm size decreases. Since competition in the non-liberalizing country
is unchanged, the cut-off production cost for exporting in the liberalizing country is unchanged, and
the number of exporters and their export sales are also unchanged (so entry into exporting is not
a consideration of this model in the short run). The domestic sales of firms decrease, and therefore
all non exiting firms (exporters and non-exporters) decrease in size. This effect is dominated by the
exit of small firms and overall the average firm size increases.
In terms of short-run changes in the size distribution of firms, this implies that the distribution
of all firms loses its left tail, has lower variance and shifts left; the size distribution of non-exporters
exhibits the same patterns; and the distribution of exporters shifts left but has an unchanged vari-
ance.
The long-run predictions are different. Since now firms have an incentive to locate in the non-
liberalizing country (in order to escape high competition in the domestic country and to benefit from
low import tariffs into the domestic country), there is less competition in the liberalizing country
and the cost cut-off for producing increases. There is greater entry of small firms, the number of
firms operating increases and average size decreases. The variance of firm size increases. On the
other hand competition in the non-liberalizing country increases (due to relocation of firms from the
liberalizing country) so it becomes more difficult to be an exporter in the liberalizing country. The
cost cut-off for exporting decreases, the number of exporters thus decreases in the long-run and the
smaller exporters are the ones that exit the export market. Export sales of exporters decrease (at
all levels of the cost distribution), and domestic sales of all firms increase. The increase in domestic
sales outweighs the decrease in export sales of exporters.
So in the long run, a decrease in trade costs causes the size distribution of all firms to have a
longer left tail and greater variance. The distribution of non-exporters has longer tails and greater
variance, and shifts right. That of exporters loses its left tail and shifts right.
Table 4.1 summarizes the predicted effects of trade liberalization on firm dynamics according to
Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Melitz (2003) predicts a shift in production from
small to large firms and from non-exporters to exporters. In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the effects
are pro-competitive in the short run, with greater exit and all firms decreasing in size. In the long
run, competition decreases and all firms become larger.
Table 4.2 summarizes the effects on the size distribution of exporters and non-exporters. Melitz
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(2003) predicts that the distribution of exporters becomes flatter and shifts left if there is massive
entry into exporting, while that of non-exporters also shifts left but becomes more peaked. Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008) predicts a leftward shift for both exporters and non-exporters in the short
run, and a rightward shift in the long run.6
4.3 Data description and the environment
There were two main trade and other policy changes in Colombia that could have affected plant
size between 1981 and 1990. Firstly, after having appreciated between 1975 and 1981, the Peso
underwent a real depreciation between 1982 and 1986, then remained stable. The PPP conversion
factor to exchange rate ratio published by the World Bank, which gives the number of US dollars
required to buy a bundle of goods in Colombia as compared to the US, was 0.48 in 1981 and 1982,
then began to decline sharply until 1986 (0.33), then slowly declined to 0.28 in 1990. As a result, the
terms of trade became more favorable to exporters from 1982 onwards.7 Second, there were major
changes in the import tariff structure. The early 1980s were a period of tariff increases, in response
to the appreciation of the Peso. Protection levels varied considerably across industries. When large
unilateral tariff cuts started in 1985, the differences in tariffs across sectors were also lowered: There
was therefore considerable sectoral variation in tariff cuts. To sum up, the first period (1981-1985)
is characterized by a real depreciation of the Peso and an increase in tariffs, while the second period
(1986-1990) is characterized by a reduction in tariffs.
I use a dataset of plants from the Colombian manufacturing survey, which includes all manu-
facturing plants with at least 10 employees. Ten years are covered, between 1981 and 1990. I end
the dataset in 1990 because a vast labor market reform that significantly reduced the cost of firing
was introduced in 1990, and might be confounded with the impact of trade liberalization on plant
employment. Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler (2009) show that this reform lead to strong
plant-level labor adjustments.
I follow the distributions in 1981, 1986 and 1990, because the real depreciation of the Peso began
in 1982 and ended in 1986, and tariff cuts began in 1985. Following the densities every year shows
that 1986 is a turning point in their evolution. After cleaning the data there are 6,589 plants in
6There exist other heterogeneous-firms models that yield predictions on the effects of trade liberalization on the
size distribution of all firms, such as Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) and Nocke and Yeaple (2006). I do not test
the predictions of Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) as this two-industry model is difficult to transpose empirically
into a multi-industry setting. Nocke and Yeaple (2006) focuses on the impact of trade costs on the skewness of the
overall distribution of firms. Changes in trade costs affect the skewness of the size distribution through the sale of
product lines between small and large firms. Since in this model all firms export, this framework is not appropriate
to derive predictions on the size distribution by exporter status.
7In addition, export subsidies increased between 1983 and 1984, before stopping as the terms of trade were more
favorable to exporters.
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1981, 6,532 in 1986 and 7,256 in 1990. There are still 12% of observations in 1981, 1.2% in 1986 and
9.5% in 1990 with employment less than 10. Their presence is likely to be due to sampling anomalies
and changes in the sampling frame in certain years, when plants with less than 10 employees were
sampled. For the purpose of this paper, since I focus on the years 1981, 1986 and 1990, for which
there are a fair number of plants with less than 10 employees, I choose to keep all the data available,
bearing in mind that the plants with less than 10 employees might be slightly under represented.
The main variables of interest are plant employment, export sales, industry and age.
The data span 27 industries at the 3-digit SIC level. Table 4.3 gives the breakdown of the share of
plants and their average size by industry. The first columns for each year indicate that the industrial
composition of plants has remained stable over time. Labor shares (column 2 for each year) also
indicate that there has been hardly any labor reallocation across industries between 1981 and 1990.8
The third columns indicate great heterogeneity in average scale across industries.
Now let us consider the sample of exporters. Unlike the evidence in Table 4.3 against changes in
the industrial composition of plants overall, it is clear from Table 4.4 that there have been changes
in the industrial composition of exporters: The second columns for each year indicate that the
shares of each industry in the total number of exporters have changed over time. Column 1 shows
the heterogeneity in the proportion of exporters: For example 39% of the plants in industry 351
(engines and turbines) were exporters in 1981, while 313 (boot and shoe cut stock and findings)
had only 3% of their plants exporting. There was also a lot of heterogeneity in the trajectories
of individual industries, some increasing in their proportion of exporters and others decreasing.
Finally, the labor shares indicate that there has been little labor reallocation across industries, as in
the whole sample.
4.4 The distribution of plant size
In this section I first check whether the basic predictions in terms of plant dynamics laid out
in Table 4.1 are confirmed in the data. I then turn to testing the predictions in terms of size
distributions. The data reveal a distinct leftward shift in the size distribution of exporters. Finally,
I analyze which of the roles of incumbents or net entry can best explain this distribution shift.
From the information in section 3, it is clear that several sometimes simultaneous policy changes
occurred during the period of observation. In period 1 (1981-1985), the real depreciation that
began in 1982 is a form of trade liberalization through facilitated exports according to the Melitz
8Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) come to the same conclusion.
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(2003) model. However, using Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), this real depreciation is equivalent to a
unilateral increase in protection, as it reduces competition from imported varieties. The simultaneous
increase in tariffs is also a unilateral increase in protection according to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
yielding the same predictions as the simultaneous real depreciation of the currency. Domestic tariff
changes without foreign tariff changes are not interpretable using Melitz (2003).9 In period 2 (1986-
1990), the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model can predict the impact of trade liberalization in the
form of a unilateral reduction in tariffs.
4.4.1 The impact of trade liberalization on plant dynamics
It can be inferred from Table 4.1 that, according to the Melitz (2003) model, we can expect to see
the share of exporters and their size increase in period 1, while the size of non-exporters decreases.
According to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), in period 1 all plants should increase in size in the short
run. In the long run all plants will shrink and the share of exporters will increase. In period 2, all
plants should decrease in size and the share of exporters should increase in the short run. In the
long run all plants should become larger and the share of exporters should decrease.
The final lines of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 confirm the long run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) for period 1. In period 1, average plant size decreases overall, but more sharply for exporters
during period 1.10 The share of exporters increases. In period 2 however, average plant size is
unchanged and exporter share continues to increase. This is consistent with the short run effects
predicted by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), or with a combination of the long run effects of the policy
changes that occurred in period 1and the long run effects of those that occurred in period 2. However
these are average effects and I now turn to a more detailed analysis in terms of the distribution of
plant size.
4.4.2 The impact of trade liberalization on the size distributions
In this subsection, I first examine the shape of the distribution of plant size, overall and by
exporter status. In particular I will check for lognormality. I then lay out the changes expected during
each of the two periods of policy changes, as predicted by Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008). Finally, I check whether the expected changes are observed in the data by comparing the
distributions before and after each period.
9Melitz (2003) only considers the case of a symmetric reduction in the variable trade cost, most probably for
reasons of tractability.
10Tables 4.3 and 4.4 also show that on average exporters are larger and older than non-exporters.
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4.4.2.1 Testing for lognormality
In order to examine the size distribution of plants, and to be able to compare exporters and
non-exporters in terms of class of distribution and also in terms of relative size, I use kernel density
estimation. As discussed previously, earlier work in the literature on the distribution of firm size
finds that lognormality, which follows from Gibrat’s Law, does not hold for comprehensive datasets
but that it holds for the subset of more mature firms (Cabral and Mata (2003)). As exporters differ
from non-exporters in many ways, we can also expect the subset of exporters to not only be larger
but also to follow a different distribution from that of non-exporters.
Figure 4.1 displays kernel density estimates of plant size distributions, in terms of employment,
for the whole sample and that of exporters and non-exporters, in 1981.11 The size distribution of
the whole sample of plants is right skewed (dotted line), which corroborates the results obtained by
Cabral and Mata (2003) using a comprehensive survey of all Portuguese firms. However, comparing
the size density of exporters (dashed line) to that of non-exporters (solid line), we can see that the
density of exporters is more symmetric (less skewed), to the right, with a greater mode. So exporters
are larger and their size distribution appears lognormal.
In order to check formally if Gibrat’s prediction of lognormality holds in this data, I use the
skewness-kurtosis test of normality as well as plots comparing quantiles of the distribution of log
employment with quantiles of the normal distribution. Table 4.5 reports the results of the skewness-
kurtosis tests performed on ln plant employment, the null hypothesis being that ln employment is
normally distributed.12 N is the number of observations used in the test, and the joint p-value is a
combined p-value from separate skewness and kurtosis tests. If the joint p-value is greater than 0.01,
then the null hypothesis that the data is normally distributed cannot be rejected. The hypothesis
that the distribution of ln employment is normal is rejected at the 0.01 level of significance for the
whole sample and for the sample of non-exporters in 1981, 1986 and 1990. But for the sample of
exporters, it is not rejected in 1981 and 1990.
The quantile plots compare ordered values of ln employment with quantiles of the normal distri-
bution. If the two distributions match, the dots on figures 4.2 and 4.3 should replicate the 45-degree
line. So Figure 4.2 shows that the distribution of the log of the size of exporters is very close to
the normal distribution in all three years, while the quantile plots in Figure 4.3 indicate that the
distribution of the log of the size of non-exporters differs significantly from the normal distribution.
11I report here the data for 1981. The relative positions and shapes of the distributions of plant size for exporters
and non-exporters are similar in all years.
12I use the skewness-kurtosis test rather than other available tests for normality because of the large number of
observations.
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This paper therefore presents an interesting and novel result: the size distribution of exporters is
lognormal,13 while that of non-exporters is more right skewed than the lognormal. This means that
exporters are neither a random sample of the overall population nor exactly the right tail of that
distribution. In the heterogeneous firms models, the most productive and therefore the largest firms
export (ie at a given point in time all the firms above a certain size export), while these data indicate
that the larger the plant the more likely it is of being an exporter. This difference in distributions
is not driven by the fact that exporters are older, as Appendix 4 indicates that the same patterns
are observed when one scales plant size by plant age.
4.4.2.2 Testing for the effects of trade liberalization
I now consider the size distribution of plants, by exporter status, before and after the policy
changes, in each of the two periods. The predictions from theory follow from Table 4.2 and have
been reorganized in Table 4.6 to lay out more clearly, period by period, the predictions given by
each model, given the combination of policy changes occurring in each period. The two models yield
different predictions in terms of shifts and changes in the tails of the distribution, and in terms
of changes in variance, which depend on the extent of entry into exporting and on whether we
consider short run or long run effects. For each period, I will first outline the expected changes in
the distribution of plant size, as laid out in Table 4.6. Then, in order to identify which model best
predicts the impact of policy changes on the size distributions, I use kernel density estimates of the
size distributions of exporters and non-exporters, at the beginning and at the end of each period, as
well as statistics reporting the evolution of plant size for several centiles of the distribution of plant
size.
For period 1, between 1981 and 1986, the Melitz (2003) model predicts an increase in the variance
of the size distribution of exporters and a leftward shift if there has been massive entry into exporting.
The size distribution of non-exporters should also shift left but become more peaked. According
to the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework however, period 1 is a period of trade protection.
This model therefore predicts a rightward shift for exporters in the short run and a leftward shift
with a longer left tail in the long run. non-exporters also shift right in the short run and left in the
long run, losing the left tail. Figure 4.4 shows kernel density estimates of the distributions of plant
size for exporters and non-exporters. Focusing on the distributions of plant size in 1981 (solid line)
and 1986 (dashed line), we see a distinct leftward shift in the size distribution of exporters, and the
size distribution of non-exporters becomes more peaked. Now turning to the evidence in Table 4.7,
13To be more precise: the hypothesis that the distribution is lognormal cannot be rejected.
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which reports plant sizes for several centiles of the size distribution in 1981, 1986 and 1990, we can
see that the whole distribution of exporters has shifted left between 1981 and 1986, and that the
variance has decreased. Table 4.7 also confirms that both tails of the distribution of non-exporters
become shorter and the distribution is more peaked (as the standard deviation decreases). This is
evidence for the long run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), as well as for Melitz (2003) if
there is massive entry into exporting and exit of the smallest non-exporters. These results do not
suggest any evidence for the short run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), indicating that
Colombian plants may have had a high level of flexibility.
Now moving on to period 2, the short run effects predicted by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) are
a leftward shift for both exporters and non-exporters, with the size distribution of non-exporters
losing its left tail and reducing in variance. In the long run, both distributions shift right, with that
of exporters losing its left tail and that of non-exporters increasing in variance, with longer tails.
However Figure 4.4 shows that between 1986 (dashed line) and 1990 (dotted line) the left tail of the
size distribution of exporters becomes longer while the rest of the distribution is largely unchanged.
This is confirmed by Table 4.7 where we can see that although the size of plants at every centile
has become smaller between 1986 and 1990, plants in the first centile of the size distribution of
exporters are 50% smaller in 1990 than in 1986, while plants in the 95th to the 99th centiles are less
than 2% smaller. Now turning to non-exporters, Figure 4.4 shows that the left tail becomes thicker
and longer, consistent with the fact that Table 4.7 reports a reduction in the size of plants at all
centiles of the size distribution that is more pronounced at the lower centiles. Table 4.7 also reports
a decrease in variance.
The observed patterns are compared to the corresponding predictions in Table 4.8. Prima facie,
the patterns for period 2 partly corroborate the short run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008). The thickening of the left tail of the distribution of non-exporters between 1986 and 1990 is
inconsistent with higher exit of the smallest plants.14
Also of high relevance is the fact that the patterns observed in period 2 must be analyzed taking
into account the lingering effects of the policy changes that occurred in period 1. What is striking
in Figure 4.4 is that although the size distribution of non-exporters seems to revert toward its initial
(1981) position by the end of period 2, that of exporters does not. So the distribution of exporters
14One could argue that the reappearance of the left tail of the distribution after 1986 is merely due to a sample
anomaly, as fewer small plants were sampled in 1986 than in 1981 or 1990. Although there have been temporary
changes in the sampling frame that allowed more plants with less than 10 employees into the dataset in 1981 and
1990 than in 1986, this does not drive the results: The bottom panel of Table 4.7 shows that the size of plants in the
first and fifth centiles of the size distribution (with plant sizes less than 10) follows the same evolution in time as the
size of plants in the 10th and 25th centiles (with plant sizes greater than 10).
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observed after period 2 could be the result of a combination of the long run effects of the policy
changes that occurred in period 2 and of the lingering long run effects of the changes that occurred
in period 1. In period 1, in both the Melitz (2003) and the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) models, the
leftward shift of exporters is caused by massive entry into exporting of smaller plants as the cutoffs
for exporting become more favorable. I will look for evidence of the role of massive entry of smaller
exporters in the next subsection. The long run effect predicted for period 2 by Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) is a rightward shift caused by the exit of exporters as the cost cutoff for exporting decreases.
However, as mentioned earlier, there is evidence in the trade literature of export hysteresis, in
particular in the case of Colombian plants. The fact that the size distribution of exporters does not
shift back rightward in period 2 appears to be evidence of this export hysteresis, where once plants
have started exporting, they are unlikely to exit the export market even if their profits become
negative. Since the patterns observed in period 2 do not correspond clearly to a single prediction,
it is also important to check if the results for period 2 become clearer when we consider separately
industries with high and low tariff cuts. I will address this issue in the next section.
In terms of robustness, Appendix 4 deals with the fact that exporters are also older. Cabral and
Mata (2003) had found that older firms have a size distribution that is more symmetric, to the right,
and with a higher mode than younger firms. So it is not clear whether exporters are larger (and
their size lognormally distributed) because they are older or whether they are older (i.e. they have
survived longer) because they are larger. I therefore examine the distribution of plant employment
scaled by plant age: Appendix 4 shows that the patterns are very similar to those identified using
plant employment: exporters are still larger and the shape and shifts of the size distributions of
exporters and non-exporters are the same as in the un-scaled case. Similarly, in Appendix 5, in
order to account for the changes in the industrial composition of exporters observed in Table 4.4, I
scale plant employment by mean industry employment and I find similar patterns.
4.4.3 The role of incumbents vs. that of net entry
I now focus on explaining the observed leftward shift in the size distribution of exporters observed
during period 1. As discussed above, this observation is consistent with the predictions in Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) and in Melitz (2003) when there is massive entry of small exporters into exporting.
To test whether it is indeed massive entry into exporting of smaller plants that has caused this
leftward shift, I separate exporters into three categories, incumbents, entrants and exiters, and I
assess their respective roles in the leftward shift of exporters using kernel density estimates.
The incumbents are plants that exported both in 1981 and 1986 (which I will call stayers), the
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exiters are plants that exported in 1981 but did not export in 1986 either because they stopped
exporting or because they exited ( I call this category stoppers), and the entrants are plants that
exported in 1986 but were not exporting in 1981 either because they were operating but non-exporters
in 1981 or because they entered after 1981 (starters).
Using this categorization there can be three explanations for the leftward shift in the density of
exporters. First, the stayers could have become smaller. Figure 4.5, shows that the distribution of
stayers in 1986 is very similar to that in 1981, with a slight leftward shift. So this hypothesis can
partly explain the leftward shift of exporters. Figure 4.5 also shows that plants that were exporting
both in 1981 and in 1986 (dotted line) were initially larger than exporters overall (solid line). A
second explanation would be that the stoppers were among the larger exporters in 1981. I can rule
this out as Figure 4.6 clearly shows that the stoppers (dotted line) were smaller than exporters
overall (solid line) in 1981.
The third possible explanation is that in 1981 the starters (i.e. future exporters) were smaller
than the existing exporters. I examine this possibility using Figure 4.7. The 1981 size density of
starters (dotted line) reports the data only for the plants that were operating but not exporting
in 1981 (The proportion of starters that began operating after 1981 is 19.5%). The distribution
is considerably more to the left than that of existing exporters (solid line), which means that in
1981 future exporters were smaller than current exporters. Moreover, the density of starters in
1981 (dotted line) is closer and more similar to that of exporters (solid line) than to that of all
non-exporters (dashed line). This is evidence for the selection of future exporters among larger
non-exporters, a common result of the heterogeneous-firms models. I now turn to the 19.5% of
starters who began operating after 1981. Figure 4.8 reports the kernel density estimate of their size
distribution in 1986, comparing it to the 1986 size distribution of all exporters. Quite logically, these
new entrants are smaller than the whole group of exporters which includes older plants, and their
entry into exporting therefore also explains the leftward shift in the size distribution of exporters.
Finally, the extent of entry of small plants into exporting can be seen in Table 4.7: The number of
exporters increased by 6% between 1981 and 1986, while the number of non-exporters decreased by
1.7%, and the size of plants in the lower centiles of the size distribution of exporters shrank.
The above results demonstrate that the leftward shift in the size distribution of exporters is due
to some extent to the shrinking of stayers, and to a greater extent to the entry of smaller plants into
exporting. The latter is evidence towards both heterogeneous-firms models. However the shrinking
of stayers is evidence against the Melitz (2003) model, which predicts that incumbent exporters
should grow during trade liberalization. It is evidence in favor of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
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model, since in this framework period 1 is a period of trade protection during which exporters (as
well as non-exporters) should become smaller in the long run.
4.5 Industry variation
The magnitude of the effects predicted by the two heterogeneous-firms models tested in this paper
can vary across industries, along two dimensions. The first dimension is the export extensiveness of
industries: industries that have a smaller proportion of exporting plants have a greater margin of
entry into exporting, and we can expect that trade liberalization would induce a greater leftward
shift of the size distribution of exporters in these industries. The second dimension is the degree
of tariff changes: the effects predicted by the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model should be more
pronounced for industries that had greater tariff cuts in period 2.
4.5.1 Variation according to export extensiveness
In order to test if the size distribution of plants in non export extensive industries shifts left to a
greater extent than that of plants in export extensive industries, I compare kernel density estimates
for the size distributions of exporters in each group of industries, at the beginning and at the end of
period 1. The group of non export extensive industries is defined by industries that have a proportion
of exporters in 1981 of 6% or less, as indicated in column 1 of Table 4.4. These are industries 311,
312, 313, 314, 324, 332, and 369, and this group has a plant count of 2047 in 1981. I define the
group of export extensive industries by industries with a share of exporters of at least 24% in 1981,
i.e. industries 323, 351, 361, 362, and 385, with a plant count of 682 in 1981.15
Figure 4.9 shows that although there is hardly any shift between 1981 and 1986 in the size
distribution of exporters in export extensive industries, there is a large leftward shift in non export
extensive industries. This strengthens the evidence in subsection 4.2 in favor of both heterogeneous-
firms models.
4.5.2 Variation according to the degree of tariff changes
The second type of variation we can expect is across industries with differing tariff cuts. I define
high tariff cut industries as having an overall tariff decrease of 46% or more between 1986 and 1990,
and low tariff cut industries as having either no tariff decrease or a decrease of 9% or less. This
15The median industry has a share of exporters of 13%. The group of non export extensive industries represent the
bottom 26% and the group of export extensive industries the top 19% of the distribution of exporter shares (as seen
in column 1 of Table 4.4). Because of the skew in the distribution of exporter shares I choose not to include industries
382 and 383, with respective exporter shares of 20% and 18%, into the export extensive sample.
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amounts to 649 high tariff cut plants and 1474 low tariff cut plants in 1986.16 The list of industries
belonging to each group and their associated tariff changes are reported in Appendix 6. I focus on
the long run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), since section 4 has shown little evidence
that any short run effects can be observed, and on period 2, the period of tariff cuts. As described
in Table 4.6, we expect to see the size distributions of exporters and non-exporters shift to the right
to a greater extent for industries with high tariff cuts.
Figure 4.10 shows that the evolution of the size distributions of exporters and non-exporters are
very different for the two industry groups. Although the size distribution of exporters has remained
stable for low tariff cut industries, it has shifted right for high tariff cut industries, as predicted by
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Also in accordance with the predictions, although the size distribution
of non-exporters has shifted left for low tariff cut industries, it has somewhat shifted right for high
tariff cut industries.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper I have investigated the effects of trade liberalization on the size distributions of
exporting and non exporting plants, using three cross sections of the annual survey of Colombian
manufacturing plants. The data span two periods of policy changes. The first period, from 1981
to 1985 saw a real depreciation of the domestic currency and an increase in import tariffs, and the
second period, from 1986 to 1990 saw a stabilization of the currency and decreases in import tariffs.
I use two heterogeneous-firms trade models, Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), to
derive period-by-period predictions on the impact of these policy changes on the size distribution of
exporters and non-exporters. I then use kernel density estimates as well as statistics of the plant size
distribution to assess the differences in plant size distributions for exporters and for non-exporters
before and after each period of policy changes.
The first result is a contemporaneous comparison of the size distributions of exporters and non-
exporters. I find that the two distributions differ in their shape and in their relative positions.
The size distribution of exporters is lognormal, and to the right of that of non-exporters. That of
non-exporters is more right skewed than the lognormal. The second set of results concerns the plant
dynamics that occur during trade liberalization and that underly the changes in the distribution of
plant size. The patterns observed support the long run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
in both periods. The third set of results reveal period by period the changes in the distribution of
16The median industry is industry 381 with a tariff cut of 29.5%. The groups of high and low tariff cut industries
represent respectively the top and the bottom 19% of the distribution of tariff cuts.
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exporters and non-exporters. There is a distinct leftward shift in the size distribution of exporters
during period 1 (meaning that plants at all centiles of the distribution are smaller), followed by no
shift but a longer left tail during period 2 (i.e. there are more small plants). The size distribution
of non-exporters becomes more peaked with shorter tails in period 1 (i.e. there are fewer small
and large plants), then becomes less peaked again during period 2. This is evidence in favor of the
predictions of Melitz (2003) with massive entry of smaller exporters, and for the long run predictions
of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). In period 2 there is some indication that export hysteresis prevents
the new entrants into exporting from period 1 from exiting the export market in period 2 (as should
be the case according the the long run predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)). The fourth
result is that the leftward shift in the size distribution of exporters is due to massive entry of smaller
plants into exporting (which further confirms the results of both heterogeneous-firms models), and
to a lesser extent to the downsizing of continuous exporters (which is consistent with the long run
predictions of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and inconsistent with Melitz (2003)). Finally, in the fifth
set of results I find variation in the strength of the results according to characteristics of industries.
I first find stronger results in non export extensive industries, which strengthens the evidence on the
importance of entry of smaller plants into exporting. I also find that comparing the results obtained
from the subsamples of high and low tariff cut industries yields clearer results for period 2: the long
run effects predicted by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) can now clearly be seen for the subsample of
high tariff cut industries, whereas there is no evidence of these effects in the subsample of low tariff
cut industries.
This paper therefore contributes to the literature on the distribution of plant size by establish-
ing that the size distribution of exporters is lognormal whereas that of non-exporters is more right
skewed. It also contributes to the trade literature that estimates the effects of trade liberaliza-
tion, by testing predictions derived from two heterogeneous-firms models regarding effects on the
size distribution of plants by exporter status. The results also add to the wide literature on how
exporting plants differ from non-exporters. Possible extensions of this work include exploring the
plant dynamics that make the size distribution of exporters different from that of non-exporters,
and discriminating between the effects of different policies on the size distributions.
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Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Summary of predictions on firm dynamics
Effects of trade
liberalization
Melitz (2003) Melitz and Ottaviano (2008):
unilateral liberalization case.
Firm exit Increases Short run (SR): increases. Long run
(LR): decreases.
Smallest firms Exit or shrink SR: exit or shrink. LR: Get larger.
Largest firms Get larger SR: Shrink. LR: Get larger.
Nbr of ex-
porters








Increase SR: decrease. LR: increase.
Table 4.2: Summary of predictions on the size distribution of exporters and non-exporters
Effects of trade
liberalization




Flatter. Both tails become longer.
If no massive entry into exporting:
rightward shift. If massive entry:
leftward shift.
SR: unchanged variance, shifts left.




Leftward shift, more kurtosis,
shorter tails.
SR: lower variance, shifts left, left
tail drops out. LR: greater vari-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.5: Skewness-kurtosis tests of normality on ln plant employment













Table 4.6: Summary of predictions, by period








Greater variance, longer tails. Left-
ward shift if massive entry of
small exporters, otherwise right-
ward shift.
SR: rightward shift. LR: Longer left
tail, leftward shift.
non-exporters: non-exporters:
More peaked, shorter tails, leftward
shift.
SR: Longer left tail, rightward shift.





Tariff cuts. SR: Unchanged variance, leftward
shift. LR: Left tail drops out, right-
ward shift.
non-exporters:
SR: Lower variance, left tail drops
out, leftward shift. LR: Greater
variance, longer tails, rightward
shift.
Table 4.7: Distribution of plant employment - exporters vs. non-exporters
Year N Mean Std.
dev.
Skewness Kurtosis p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
Exporters
1981 736 238 385 7.9 115 11 19 27 55 119 275 567 867 1513
1986 780 191 292 5.7 66 10 16 20 39 88.5 222 512.5 731 1283
1990 1058 186 300 5.8 61 5 11 17 37 87 208 428 715 1278
non-
exporters
1981 5853 53 146 23.2 956 4 7 8 13 22 47 104 178 537
1986 5752 50 105 13 339 7 10 11 15 23 46 100 168 446
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Data used in chapter 1
Amadeus data: The firm-level panel was built using the online version of Amadeus downloaded
in 2004 as well as three previous versions of the database on disk. These previous versions were
merged with the online one because a given version of the database only contains those firms that
filed statements in the last four years and drops the others.
Regional data: The measures of input linkages are constructed using the region-industry-level
employment data and the input-output tables for Hungary in 2000, both obtained from the Hun-
garian Statistical Institute.
Deflators: Operating revenue is deflated by industry producer price index (PPI), obtained from
the Hungarian Statistical Institute, labor is the wage bill deflated by national average wages, capital
is deflated using the PPI for industry 7 (Machinery and Equipment), and the deflator for materials
is an average of the PPI of several manufacturing industries. Industry-level imports (used in the
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Figure B.1: GDP growth in Hungary, 1986-2002
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APPENDIX C
Political map of Hungary
Figure C.1: Political map of Hungary
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APPENDIX D
Distribution of employment scaled by plant age
Figure D.1 for 1981 shows that the scaled distributions are very similar to the unscaled ones.1
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Figure D.1: Distributions of plant size scaled by plant age, by exporter status (1981)
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Figure D.3: Distributions of plant size scaled by age: non-exporters (1981, 1986 and 1990)
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APPENDIX E
Check for a composition effect
Although Table 4.4 shows that there has been a redistribution of the number of exporters towards
certain industries, this does not seem to affect the broad patterns in terms of the size distribution of
plants: scaling plant employment by industry average employment in the same year yields the same
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Table F.1: Tariff cuts between 1986 and 1990, by industry.
Industry Tariff change
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